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The purpose of the thesis was to examine whether Corporate Governance is 
necessary for medium-sized family companies in Germany or if it can be seen 
more as a voluntary commitment. The study also aimed at gaining a deep 
understanding of the elements and instruments of family business governance. 
In addition, it was a goal to analyse the level of implementation of family 
business governance in medium-sized family businesses. 
 
The information for the theoretical framework was gathered from academic 
books, research papers and recent studies, as the qualitative approach was 
chosen. In contrast, the empirical part was based on interviews with owners and 
managers of German medium-sized family companies. These interviews were 
conducted via Skype or as mail interviews.  
 
The results of the study show that medium-sized family businesses know the 
significance of good governance, but have not yet professionally implemented 
the correspondent measures and instruments. Based on the findings it can be 
concluded that the larger the family businesses are the more likely they have 
implemented family business governance mechanisms. In correspondence with 
a complex ownership and management structure the significance of family 
business governance for medium-sized family companies is rising.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Family Business, Family Business 
Governance 
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Abbreviations 
AG   Aktiengesellschaft (joint-stock company) 
 
AktG   Aktiengesetz (companies act) 
 
BetrVG  Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Constitution Act) 
 
BilMoG Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz (Accounting Law 
Modernisation Act) 
 
BilReG  Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz (Accounting Law Reform Act) 
 
DCGK Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (German 
Corporate Governance Code) 
 
e.g. for example 
 
e. K. eingetragener Kaufmann (registered merchant) 
 
ErbStG Erbschaftssteuer- und Schenkungsteuergesetz (Inheritance 
and Gift Tax Act) 
 
GKFU Governance-Kodex für Familienunternehmen (Governance 
Code for family businesses) 
 
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability 
company) 
 
GmbHG Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter 
Haftung (Limited liability company law) 
 
GmbH & Co. KG Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung und Compagnie 
Kommanditgesellschaft (limited partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner) 
 
HGB   Handelsgesetzbuch (German Commercial Code) 
 
KG   Kommanditgesellschaft (private limited partnership) 
 
KonTraG Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im 
Unternehmensbereich (Corporate Sector Supervision and 
Transparency Act) 
 
IfM   Institut für Mittelstandsforschung  
 
MitbestG Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (law on 
co-determination) 
 
OHG   Offene Handelsgesellschaft (general partnership) 
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PublG   Publizitätsgesetz (Public Disclosure Act) 
 
SME   Small and medium-sized enterprises 
 
TransPuG Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz (Transparency and 
Disclosure Act) 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Family businesses are different than publicly owned companies, as they are 
dominated by a family, which aims at keeping the company over generations. 
Family businesses tend to have potential competitive advantages compared to 
large-scale enterprises due to a long-term strategic direction and a greater 
continuity of management, but they also face risks like family conflicts, which 
might have a negative impact on the company. (Koeberle-Schmid, Witt & 
Fahrion 2012, pp. 26-29.) 
Family businesses have a great economic relevance in Germany. Around 92 
percent of all German companies are family-controlled and they achieve 51 
percent of all sales and employ 60 percent of all employees. A majority of them 
are small and medium-sized companies. (Stiftung Familienunternehmen 2011.)  
However, some family businesses fail due to crisis in the company and in the 
family, while others can raise their value and stay successful for a long-time. 
The question is what is the difference between them? It became evident that 
companies with optimally formed management, control and family structures 
seem to be more successful and therefore corporate governance is a relevant 
success factor. (Koeberle-Schmid et al. 2012, pp. 26-29.) In 2010 the 
governance code for family businesses was launched by INTES and ASU to 
support family businesses with the implementation of corporate governance by 
giving recommendations (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2010, p. 2). This shows that corporate governance in 
medium-sized family businesses is a relevant topic, but Raps and Fieber (2003) 
stated that until now science and literature pay scant attention to it (Ulrich 2011, 
p. 107.). 
1.2 Objectives, delimitations and limitations of the study 
The objective of this study is to analyse the importance of corporate governance 
in medium-sized family businesses in Germany. In addition, it is a goal of the 
thesis to examine the level of implementation of corporate governance in 
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medium-sized family businesses. Furthermore, the purpose of the thesis is to 
gain a deep understanding of the characteristics and the elements of family 
business governance. 
The thesis broaches the issue of corporate governance in German family 
businesses. Corporate governance in other countries is excluded and corporate 
governance of publicly owned companies is only taken into account when it is 
necessary to compare them to family enterprises. Furthermore, the focus of this 
thesis is on medium-sized enterprises, as there is only little information about 
corporate governance in those companies. Therefore micro and small-sized 
enterprises, as well as large-scale corporations are left out in the thesis, except 
for comparing them with the medium-sized companies. In addition, this research 
paper does not cover the practical implementation and the development of 
exact guidelines of corporate governance for medium-sized family businesses, 
as this would go beyond the scope of the thesis. 
One limitation of the thesis is that it compares the theoretical findings only with 
a relatively small number of companies. This is due to the fact that the author 
has only a limited time frame in Germany and it could impact on the reliability 
and validity of the analysis. An increased number of participants could enhance 
the representativeness of the research paper. Moreover, all industry sectors are 
considered. However, different industries could be influenced by certain 
characteristics and factors, which affect the exigency of corporate governance 
in family businesses. Another limitation is the circumstance that all legal forms 
are considered to be applicable in the empirical analysis, although some legal 
forms might have certain requirements and legal obligations, which precede 
corporate governance recommendations. 
1.3 Research questions 
The thesis examines corporate governance in medium-sized family businesses 
in Germany. Therefore the main research question is: 
- How important is family business governance in German medium-sized 
family businesses? 
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Furthermore, the sub research questions will support the study and they are as 
follows: 
- Why should the owners implement corporate governance in their 
businesses? 
- Which elements are appropriate? 
- What are the advantages for the owners? 
- How suitable is the governance code for medium-sized family businesses? 
These research questions will help the author to find an answer whether 
corporate governance is more than a good opportunity for medium-sized family 
businesses in Germany. To answer them, the characteristics of small and 
medium-sized family companies, the elements of family business governance 
as well as the Governance Code for Family businesses are going to be 
examined in the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
1.4 Research method 
For the theoretical part about family businesses and corporate governance, the 
qualitative approach was chosen and thus the author gathered information from 
academic books, research papers and current studies. Some data was also 
required from internet sources, e.g. current figures about medium-sized 
enterprises and family businesses. The research methods of the empirical part 
are described in chapter 5.1. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of six chapters. The two parts after the introductory chapter 
deal with the theoretical framework of the study. One of the chapters explains 
the terms “small- and medium-sized enterprises”, the “German Mittelstand” and 
“family businesses”. Furthermore, the economic relevance, typical 
characteristics and types of family businesses are elucidated. Finally it closes 
with a definition of German medium-sized family businesses, which is the basis 
for further research. In the third chapter corporate governance is analysed. 
Therefore the theoretical foundations of the principal-agent theory and the 
stewardship theory are explained. In addition, corporate governance for publicly 
owned companies is briefly highlighted. The next chapter of the thesis 
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comprises information about family business governance and the governance 
code for family businesses. This includes objectives, advantages and 
disadvantages, as well as instruments and elements of family business 
governance. Moreover, the structure of the code is highlighted and the 
relevance for medium-sized family businesses is examined. The fifth chapter 
defines the empirical requirements, analyses the empirical data and records the 
findings. The study closes with a summary of the study and its findings, as well 
as with recommendations for further research. 
2. Classification of small and medium-sized enterprises and family 
businesses 
In Germany the terms small and medium-sized companies, “Mittelstand” and 
family businesses are used quite synonymously. They have many similarities 
and analogies, but they also have differences. (Hamer 1990; Khadjavi 2005, p. 
53.) In addition, often there are various definitions available. Therefore, this 
chapter presents the most important ones and in the last sub-chapter a valid 
and applicable definition of medium-sized family companies in the thesis is 
presented.  
2.1 Small and medium-sized enterprises 
According to the Institut für Mittelstandsforschung (IfM) Bonn (2014b) small and 
medium-sized companies (SME) are defined by the number of employees and 
annual turnover. Due to these parameters companies with up to nine 
employees and an annual turnover of up to one million euros are categorised as 
small companies, while medium-sized companies have up to 499 employees 
and annual sales revenues of up to 50 million euros (Table 1). (IfM 2014b.) 
Taking this definition under consideration more than 99 percent of all German 
enterprises can be classified as SMEs in 2014 (IfM 2014d). 
Company size Number of employees Turnover 
Small-sized < 10 < 1 million € 
Medium-sized < 500 < 50 million € 
Table 1. Definition of SME (IfM Bonn 2014b.) 
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The European Union also determines SMEs with the factors number of 
employees and either the turnover or the balance sheet total (Table 2). 
However, they have slightly different size classifications. According to the 
European Union micro companies have less than ten employees and a turnover 
or balance sheet total of less than two million euros, whereas small companies 
have between eleven and fifty employees and an annual turnover or balance 
sheet total of less than ten million euros. All companies with a turnover of less 
than 50 million Euros or a balance sheet total of less than 43 million Euros are 
categorised as medium-sized. In addition, they do not have more than 250 
employees. Nevertheless, these figures only apply to independent companies, 
not subsidiaries. (European Union 2014.) 
Company size 
Number of 
employees 
Turnover 
Balance sheet 
total 
Micro < 10 ≤ 2 million € ≤ 2 million € 
Small-sized < 50 ≤ 10 million € ≤ 10 million € 
Medium-sized < 250 ≤ 50 million € ≤ 43 million € 
Table 2. Definition of SME (European Union 2014.) 
The Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) also classifies companies in paragraph 267 (§ 
267 HGB). In this paragraph small companies are those, which have either not 
more than a 4.84 million euros balance sheet total or a 9.68 million euros 
turnover. Furthermore, they have on average fifty employees. Companies with a 
19.25 million Euros balance sheet total or a 38.5 million euros turnover are 
determined as medium-sized. Moreover, they do not employ more than 250 
people on average. An overview is given in Table 3.  
Company size Ø employees Turnover Balance sheet total 
Small-sized < 50 ≤ 9,68 million € ≤ 4,84 million € 
Medium-sized < 250 ≤ 38,5 million € ≤ 19,25 million € 
Table 3. Definition of SME according to HGB (§267 HGB.) 
2.2 German Mittelstand 
In Germany the term “economic Mittelstand” is also quite common to describe 
SMEs. The definition of the IfM Bonn is quantitative, whereas Mittelstand 
describes those companies in a qualitative way. A company ranks among the 
“Mittelstand” when ownership, control and management are unified (Ulrich 
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2011, pp. 24-30). Therefore “Mittelstand” is strongly connected to family 
businesses, which is explained in the next chapter, but independent small and 
medium-sized companies also belong to this group. However, small and 
medium-sized companies, which are not owner-run, have to be excluded. 
Besides, the size of a “Mittelstand” company is limited and the owner 
participates in and determines strategic decisions (Ulrich 2011, pp. 24-30.). 
According to Hausch (2004) and Damken (2007) this aspect can be described 
as the personalisation of management (Ulrich 2011, p. 25). 
The “Mittelstand” describes economic, social, psychological and political issues. 
Furthermore, it is a term, which stands for the economic and legal autonomy of 
the company, which means the independence from large-scale companies and 
the exclusion of subsidiaries (Ulrich 2011, pp. 24-30). “Mittelstand” also includes 
decentralisation and decision-making, which is geared to the stakeholders of a 
company. A description of Mittelstand companies goes beyond mere 
quantitative aspects; it is more about a certain attitude, which all companies in 
this group have in common. Mostly those companies are long-term oriented; the 
owners are loyal to their employees and the region, from which they are 
coming. (IfM 2014c.) As it was said by Gantzel (1962) the economic existence 
of the entrepreneur and the company are closely connected and the company is 
often the life-task of the owner and the necessary requirement for his 
occupation (Ulrich 2011 pp. 24-30). 
2.3 Family business 
In the academic literature there is no consistent definition of family businesses 
available. However, it can be stated that the influence of property and 
management are essential for family businesses (Klein 2004, p. 3). According to 
the Stiftung Familienunternehmen (2012) there are two approaches to family 
businesses. Family-controlled companies are companies, which are under the 
control of a limited number of individuals. However, they do not necessarily 
have to manage the company. Furthermore, companies are a family business, 
in case they are controlled by a limited number of individuals and at least one of 
the owners is participating in the management. (Stiftung Familienunternehmen 
2011, pp. 5f.) This definition is also in accordance with the one of the IfM Bonn. 
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The institute augments the definition in a way that at least 50 percent of a 
company has to be owned by an individual or his family. (IfM 2014a.) In 
addition, the owners have a great influence on the vision, strategies, objectives 
and governance of the company (Koeberle-Schmid 2008, p. 150). Another 
definition for family businesses was delivered by Chua, Chrisman and Sharma 
(1999), who describe them as “governed and/or managed with the intention to 
shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition 
controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in 
manner that is potentially sustainable across generation of the family or 
families”. (Ulrich 2011, pp. 30-32.)  
As shown in Figure 1, the typology according to Becker, Staffel & Ulrich (2008a) 
is based on property and management. Type A describes companies which are 
owned and managed by an individual person, whereas type B is either a family 
business, which is owned by an individual and managed by the family, owned 
by a family and managed by an individual or ownership and management are in 
the hands of a family. Externally managed companies are combined in type C. 
This includes both the ownership of an individual and of a family with external 
management.  Type D consists of companies which are possessed by a third 
party and are managed by a person or family, while type E describes publicly 
owned companies with external management. (Becker et al. 2008a, pp. 24-30.) 
This typology is the basis for the classification of the interviewed companies in 
the empirical part and it is used to determine the differences between the 
companies.  
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Figure 1. Typology according to Becker (Becker, Staffel & Ulrich 2008a, p. 30) 
To distinguish family businesses, the dynamic generation model of Ward (1987) 
can be also used. As described in the Three Circle Model below, the family 
business consists of the family, enterprise and ownership subsystems; therefore 
the values of the family are often transferred to the company. However, as Baus 
(2006) highlights, successive generations might lose the interrelations between 
family and enterprise, while the founder of the company intuitively sees and 
feels the context. Ward (1987) displays the characteristic development of the 
distribution of ownership over the generations and highlights the fragmentation 
of shares. The possible types in this generation model are the “autocratic 
entrepreneur”, “sibling partnership” and “cousin-owned family businesses”. 
(Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) 
In the family model of the “autocratic entrepreneur” the family is limited to the 
core family with parents and children. The property is shared among only a few 
partners and one dominant partner mostly has more than 75 percent of the 
shares. The founder and the owner are unified in the same person, who is also 
managing the company. Due to this fact, he or she does not need any 
protection against the owners, which is normally the reason for corporate 
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governance. The autocratic entrepreneur is able to act and decide sovereignly. 
(Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) 
The “sibling partnership” is a company, which have already faced a succession. 
Now the family consists of the families of the siblings. At this point the property 
is divided among at least two partners. None of the partners possesses more 
than 75 percent of the shares and there might be already active and passive 
partners. The management consists of more than one person and decisions 
have to be made by majority rule. At this stage there is already the possibility of 
an external management, but however, mostly the management is still family-
dominated. Due to these reasons, the threat of a potential conflict has risen. 
Besides, a supervisory board still might have a rather weak position due to low 
fragmentation of shares. (Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) 
In the “cousin-owned family business” the first dynastic structures become 
apparent, as the family consists for the first time of cousins with different degree 
of relationship and from different family lines. In such companies the property 
can be shared by up to 500 partners and none of them have more than 25 
percent of the shares. Cousin-owned family businesses are mainly managed by 
external persons and the partners are in most cases passive. With the 
advanced fragmentation, the conflict potential has risen and a supervisory 
board seems to be necessary. (Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) 
According to this model, the increased fragmentation of shares in the 
successive generations leads to a declining identification with the founder, the 
family and its values, as well as with the company itself. Due to this declining 
identification the conflict potential is rising. (Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) 
Three Circle Model 
The Three Circle Model was developed by Taguiri and Davis and can be seen 
as the central theoretical framework to understand family companies. It consists 
of the family, ownership and management subsystems, which are displayed in 
three circles (Figure 2). This model explains the relationships and mutual 
interdependences in a family company. The different possibilities of overlapping 
represent the seven kinds of family businesses, which appear in practice. 
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(Taguiri & Davis 1996, pp. 199-208.) According to Müller Tiberini (2001) the 
complete overlapping of the three circles would represent the case when all 
family members are owners and work at the same time in the business 
(Papesch 2010, pp. 31-41). If there is no intersection between the circles, this 
means according to Simon (2005) that employees are no relatives and the 
company is owned by non-family members or investors and therefore this case 
can be seen as an anonymous corporation (Papesch 2010, pp. 31-41).  
Besides, the intersections also display seven different interest groups with their 
own legitimate perspectives, goals and dynamics. Section one, two and five 
display the ownership, respectively the management and the family. The 
overlap of ownership and management represents owners who are working in 
the company, but who are not part of the family. In addition, section four 
illustrates family members who own shares, but who are not participating in the 
management, whereas family members who are working in the company, but 
not possessing any shares, are classified in section six. Section seven, the 
overlap of all circles, represents family members, who are both work in the 
company and possess company shares. Due to different behaviour and 
communication of the subsystems, the possible field of conflict is even 
increased (Baus 2010, p. 15). The insight, which can be got by the Three Circle 
Model, is that the more complex and interdependent the three sub-systems 
family, ownership and management are, the bigger is the threat that a crisis in 
one of the circles might affect the others. Therefore, the long-term success of 
family companies is dependent on the functioning and mutual support of these 
groups. (Papesch 2010, pp. 31-41.) 
 
Figure 2. The Three Circle Model (Taguiri & Davis 1996, p. 200.) 
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Economic relevance of family companies 
The “German Mittelstand” is the backbone of the German society and economy. 
As this term includes family businesses as well, the great economic relevance 
of them is evident. These companies provide constantly high productivity and 
employment. Owner-run companies amount to around 90 percent of all 
companies in Germany. Furthermore, they realise more than 47 percent of all 
sales revenues and approximately 56 percent of all employees are engaged in 
family businesses. (Stiftung Familienunternehmen 2011, p. 15.) In addition, in 
2011 99.3 percent of all German enterprises are considered as small and 
medium-sized (Destatis 2014). As there is a great overlap between family 
businesses and SMEs, it can be concluded that medium-sized family 
businesses contribute essentially to the German economy.  
Characteristics of family businesses 
Family companies enjoy respect and appreciation, as they have affected and 
are still affecting the character of the German economy. Many well-known 
brands and companies in Germany, like Henkel or Bosch, are family-owned 
businesses and they stand like any other family business for quality, innovation 
and distinctive character. Most of the family businesses are influenced by strong 
characters of entrepreneurs and entrepreneur families. This dominant influence 
is the major difference between family companies and publicly owned 
enterprises. Values from the family, like honesty, integrity, responsibility and 
solidarity, influence the core values of the company. Moreover, family 
companies have several strengths, which help them to compete successfully 
with publicly owned companies. Family businesses have often flat hierarchies 
and structures with short decision-making procedures, reliability to customers 
and business partners and long continuity. Further strengths are the internal 
and external identification and the sense of responsibility and solidarity with the 
employees and the region. Besides this major influence, families tend to keep 
the company for several generations in the hands of the family and pursue a 
long-term strategy to sustainably increase the enterprise value and maintain 
stability, cost-effectiveness and independency. (Baus 2010, pp. 13-16; Hack & 
Meyer 2012, p. 59-77; Koeberle-Schmid et al. 2012, pp. 26-43.) 
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Despite the numerous advantages, family companies are also facing 
weaknesses, which mostly have the same origin as the strengths: the family. 
Weak entrepreneur families can threaten or even ruin a family business. 
Conflicts within the family or the company are more frequently the reason for 
failing family companies than external market risks or bad circumstances.  
(Baus 2010, pp. 13-16; Hack & Meyer 2012, p. 59-77; Koeberle-Schmid et al. 
2012, pp. 26-43.) Moreover, they have mostly rare external transparency. This 
fact is not necessarily negative, but this can lead to limited financing options, as 
family businesses tend to have only limited access to the capital market. (Frasl 
& Rieger 2007, pp. 20-29.)  
2.4 Definition of medium-sized German family businesses in the thesis 
The underlying definition for the analysis of corporate governance in medium-
sized family businesses is based on quantitative and qualitative aspects. Family 
companies with the quantitative elements of a turnover between one and fifty 
million euros, as well as with a number of people employed between eleven and 
499, are the object of investigation in the thesis. Moreover, the qualitative 
elements of legal and economic autonomy have to be applicable. In addition, 
only companies of the types A, B and C according to the typology of Becker are 
examined.  
Due to these limitations, the definition for the thesis is as follows: Medium-sized 
family businesses are characterised by the legal and economic autonomy. The 
group of companies with family tradition consists of owner-run companies, 
family companies and externally managed “Mittelstand”.  A turnover between 
one and fifty million euros and the number of employees between eleven and 
499 are the quantitative attributes of medium-sized companies.  
3. Corporate governance 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
As a theoretical basis the author used several theories and concepts. The main 
theories to explain family enterprises and corporate governance are the 
principal-agent theory, the stewardship theory and the three circle theory.  
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3.1.1 Principal-agent theory 
Corporate governance is predominantly based on the principal-agent theory, 
which is a part of the new institutional economics, as it was classified by Ulrich 
(2009) (Ulrich 2011, pp. 65-70). The principal-agent theory deals with the 
appearance of specific problems within a contractual relationship between a 
principal and his or her agent. Alchian & Woodward (1988) and Arrow (1985) 
determine these problems as the adverse selection, moral hazard, hidden 
actions, information and characteristics (Ulrich 2011, pp. 65-70; Hack & Meyer 
2012, pp. 59-77). The adverse selection describes the fact that the principal 
cannot exactly evaluate the agent before engaging him due to hidden 
characteristics. Furthermore, the hidden action and hidden information 
problems appear after the conclusion of the contract. Hidden action 
circumscribes that the principal is not able to know all potential actions of the 
agent as the total supervision would exceed the principal’s capabilities. 
Moreover, there is information, which is only known to the agent and this is 
defined as hidden information. The moral hazard explains the relation of the 
agent who could benefit from information asymmetries and therefore harm the 
principal. (Ulrich 2011, pp. 65-70; Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) According to 
Hendry (2002) these problems arise due to decision uncertainty, diverging 
interests, limited rationality, information asymmetries, individual utility 
maximisation and opportunistic behaviour (Nippa & Grigoleit 2006, pp. 1-49). 
Therefore it can be assumed that the principal’s interests are affected 
negatively by inappropriate agents or the opportunistic behaviour of the agent. 
(Nippa & Grigoleit 2006, pp. 1-49.)  
Schneider (1988) states that principal-agent relationships develop if at least one 
principal and at least one agent aim to achieve common goals, which are only 
partly corresponding. Furthermore, the advantages of one individual can 
become the disadvantages of the other. (Ulrich 2011, pp. 65-70.) The principal-
agent theory is widely used to explain the relationship between a company 
owner (principal) and the management (agent). Berle & Means (1932) assumed 
the personal separation of these functions (Nippa & Grigoleit 2006, pp. 1-49). 
Due to the assumption of the homo oeconomicus both sides try to maximise 
their benefits by opportunistic behaviour. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that 
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increased control, monitoring and supervision are therefore needed, as well as 
appropriate incentives to adapt the diverging interest of principal and agent 
(Nippa & Grigoleit 2006, pp. 1-49). By Jensen & Meckling (1976) those systems 
and incentives are characterised as agency costs and can be divided into 
bonding costs, monitoring costs and residual loss. Bonding costs are the efforts 
of the agent to minimise the information asymmetries and are paid as risk 
premium. In addition, control and monitoring costs are arising due to the 
supervision of the agent. These could be instruments like management 
accounting or an internal monitoring system. Eventually, the residual loss 
emphasises the fact that the agent might still not behave totally in the interest of 
the principal despite the implemented instruments and incentives. (Ulrich 2011, 
pp. 65-70.) 
The addressed instruments, like reporting, supervisory board, a performance-
based related compensation and other means can reduce or eliminate agency-
problems. These corporate governance instruments either reduce information 
asymmetries in a way that the supervision of the agent by the principal is 
facilitated or that they provide incentives for the management in order to behave 
in the interest of the principal, which reduces the interest divergences between 
both parties. (Welge & Witt 2013, pp. 185-205.) 
In family companies the applicability of the principal-agent theory is depending 
on the owner structure. Jensen & Meckling (1976), as well as Fama & Jensen 
(1983) stated that no transaction costs occur, if ownership and management are 
unified in one person (Fama & Jensen 1983, p. 305; Witt 2008, pp. 1-19; Hack 
& Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77). Family businesses, in which one partner holds all 
shares and is at the same time managing the company, do have the unity of 
ownership and management. The same is true for companies in which all 
partners hold the same number of shares and are all participating in the 
management of the company. (Witt 2008, pp. 1-19.) Therefore it can be 
assumed that those kinds of family businesses have the most efficient way of 
governance, as they do not have any agency costs (Daily & Dollinger 1992, pp. 
120-122). However, in all other family businesses the principal-agent conflict 
can emerge. In many family businesses not all partners are participating in the 
management of the company, but they are divided into active and passive 
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partners. This can lead to moral hazards, as Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued 
that not all family members have the same interests (Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 
59-77). There might be conflicts about the objectives of the company or about 
roles and positions of single family members within the company. Those 
conflicts can be solved with suitable incentives and means, but this causes high 
costs. Due to emotional complexity, the agency problems and therefore the 
transaction costs are higher in family businesses than in non-family companies. 
(Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) 
3.1.2 Stewardship theory 
As the principal-agent theory cannot be totally justified in family businesses, 
Argyris (1964) stated that the stewardship theory can give helpful implications 
for corporate governance in family businesses (Papesch 2010, pp. 31-41). 
Moreover, Hirsch, Michaels & Friedman (1987) and Tricker (2009) criticise the 
opportunistic behaviour of the homo oeconomicus as not maintainable and not 
evidence-based (Welge & Witt 2013, pp. 185-205). According to Donaldson & 
Davis (1991) the stewardship theory assumes that managers also might be 
influenced in their behaviour by altruism (Ulrich 2011, pp. 73-77). Furthermore, 
Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson (1997) highlight that agents are acting socially 
and serve the common good (Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77) and therefore, 
they do not behave opportunistically towards the shareholders.  
The stewardship theory is based on the idea of man of a steward, which 
benefits more from the success of the company than from individual 
advantages, which are at the expense of the company. Besides, stewards feel 
strongly tied and obliged to the company they work for. This is especially 
consistent with the situation in a family business, where individual family 
members, who are working in the company, are more oriented on collective 
benefit of the family and the maximisation of the corporate value than on the 
increase of his or her own benefits. Despite these numerous advantages of the 
stewardship theory, it is quite complicated to determine whether a manager, 
both family member and external manager, behaves more like a steward or 
rather like an agent. (Papesch 2010, pp. 31-41; Welge & Witt 2013, pp. 185-
205.)  
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According to Davis et al. (1997) the shareholder of companies, in which the 
management can be seen as stewards, can trust them, give them extensive 
autonomy and abstain from control in companies (Welge & Witt 2013, pp. 185-
205).  Karra, Tracey & Philips (2006) have proven in a case study that altruism 
can help to converge the different interests of family members. This then leads 
to the reduction of transaction costs and therefore family businesses would 
need corporate governance only to a limited extent. However, this perception 
has limitations. In older and bigger family businesses altruism can cause other 
agency problems with raising transaction costs, because altruism occurs mostly 
within the immediate family. (Hack & Meyer 2012, pp. 59-77.) 
3.2 Corporate Governance and the Deutscher Corporate Governance 
Kodex 
In this chapter corporate governance in general is explained. Furthermore, the 
most important German legislation regarding this topic is outlined and the 
Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DCGK), as the most important code 
for corporate governance in Germany, is presented. 
In recent years the trust of investors has been shaken due to numerous 
corporate scandals and insolvencies. The crisis of Enron in the United States 
and the bankruptcy of Karstadt-Quelle in Germany are widely known and have 
been the catalyst for the corporate governance discussion in politics, science 
and economics, firstly in North America, later in Europe. (Welge & Eulerich 
2012, pp. 1-6; Werder 2010, p. 5.) 
Corporate governance forms the legal and factual regulation framework for the 
management and supervision of enterprises (Werder 2008, p. 1). The European 
Central Bank defines corporate governance as procedures and processes, 
which help to manage and control an organization. The rights and 
responsibilities regarding corporate governance are shared among the different 
participants of an organisation. Furthermore, the corporate governance 
structure determines rules and procedures for the decision-making process. In 
general, the board, management, shareholders and other stakeholders are 
involved in corporate governance. (European Central Bank 2005, p. 219.)  
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In corporations the supervisory board is in the centre of attention, as this 
committee also bears responsibility for corporate irregularities. To solve this 
monitoring gap, many white papers have been initiated. The central theme 
within all legislative proposals is the extension of the responsibility and 
competencies of the board, as well as stricter penalties for the members of the 
board in terms of liability. (Welge & Eulerich 2012, pp. 1-6.)  
The first law, which stipulates aspects of corporate governance, is the “Gesetz 
zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich” (KonTraG). Gleißner 
(2008) states that it does not only affect stock corporations, but also other legal 
forms, like in particular the limited liability company (GmbH) (Welge & Eulerich 
2012, pp. 25-29). The objectives of the KonTraG, as highlighted by Müller 
(2007) are to determine more exactly the obligations of the management board, 
to improve the transparency and efficiency of the board, as well as to intensify 
the cooperation of the annual auditor and the board (Welge & Eulerich 2012, 
pp. 25-29). With the KonTraG the legislative body obliges the companies to 
implement an early-warning system, make an annual report and it decrees 
various regulations for the board. (Welge & Eulerich 2012, pp. 25-29.) 
In addition, the “Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz” (TransPuG) is one of the 
most important legislative changes for the companies regarding corporate 
governance. It changes the “Aktiengesetz” (AktG) and among others it obliges 
the management board and the advisory board to comply with §161 AktG, 
which determines that listed companies have to explain annually in how far they 
have implemented the DCGK. According to Müller (2007) this article converts 
the DCGK in a binding soft law with a normative character (Welge & Eulerich 
2012, p. 29). Diederichs & Kißler (2008) highlighted that further changes, which 
are implemented with the TransPuG, are the adaptions in the size 
classifications of corporate entities and the definition of responsibilities for the 
member of the board, as well as the improvement of their information supply. 
(Welge & Eulerich 2012, pp. 29-31.) 
Corporate governance is also supported by the “Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz” 
(BilReG), which aims to increase the objectivity and autonomy of the annual 
auditor and build trust in the informational value financial reports, and the 
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“Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz” (BilMoG). According to Diederichs & 
Kißler (2008) and Ernst & Naumann (2009) the BilReG and the BilMoG adapt 
the German accounting standards to international developments. (Welge & 
Eulerich 2012, pp. 31-37.) 
Moreover, codes of conduct are of vital importance. The Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex (DCGK) is the essential soft law in this context. More and 
more of its recommendations are integrated in the legislation. The DCGK was 
firstly published in 2002 by the “Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex”. The commission was founded due to one of the biggest 
insolvencies in Germany and had several predecessors, but all of them lack 
general acceptance. The first version reacts on the main critics of the corporate 
governance system in Germany. These are the only moderate alignment on 
shareholder interests, the dualistic management with advisory board and 
management board, as well as the limited transparency and the dependency of 
the advisory board and the annual auditor. (Welge & Eulerich 2012, pp. 50-53.) 
The DCGK aims at fostering the stakeholder’s trust in the supervision and 
management of German listed corporations and the augmentation of 
transparency of the German corporate governance system. Due to the dualistic 
system and the distribution of regulations in different laws the German 
corporate governance System seems to be non-transparent for foreign 
investors. As Ringleb, Kremer, Lutter & Werder (2010) highlight the DCGK 
should therefore gain the confidence of the employees, the customers, the 
investors and the public about the management and monitoring of stock 
corporations. Moreover, the code has a regulatory function, which tends to 
improve the quality of corporate governance in German enterprises. For this 
reason, best practices are included in the code. Nevertheless, Ringleb et al. 
(2010) state that the code should maintain the flexibility of the companies, 
therefore the enterprises can adapt and optimise the recommendations of the 
code individually for their situation. A further designation of the DCGK is the 
statement that all stakeholders have to be considered by the companies. It even 
forbids the alignment with the shareholder approach. (Welge & Eulerich 2012, 
pp. 53-58.) 
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The DCGK consists of seven chapters, which are shortly outlined here. The 
preamble states the general content and objectives of the code, as well as the 
prerequisites for corporate governance in Germany. This includes for example 
the dualistic approach of management and supervision or the common 
principles of advisory board and management, like the obligation to act in 
accordance with rules of the social market economy. The commission also 
recommends applying the code to non-listed companies. 
(Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, pp. 1-
2.) 
The voting rights and the regulations for the annual stockholders meeting are 
explained in the second chapter. In the annual stockholders meeting the 
management board is obliged to present the annual statement of accounts. 
Furthermore, the participants of the meeting elect the annual auditor and the 
representatives of the shareholders. Within this chapter changes in the 
constitution of the company, the remuneration of the managing board, the 
issuing of shares or how to handle the invitation to the annual shareholders 
meeting are also discussed. In addition, the handling of elections and the voting 
right representation are issues, which are commented as well. 
(Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, pp. 3-
4.) 
The chapter “Cooperation of management board and advisory board” deals with 
the rules and regulations for the cooperation of management and advisory 
board, in particular it concretises the confidentiality, consulting, information and 
reporting obligations. In this chapter the commission also defines the liability of 
the company regarding the breach of duty. Besides, the procedures during 
meetings and for the reporting are highlighted. (Regierungskommission 
Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, pp. 4-5.) 
The fourth chapter determines the tasks and duties of the management board. It 
consists of explanations regarding the implementation of the strategy, the 
accordance with legal obligations, the responsibility for an appropriate risk 
management and risk controlling, as well as stating the self-dependent 
management of the company by the management board. Further 
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recommendations comprise the remuneration and the disclosure requirements. 
(Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, pp. 6-
8.) 
The next chapter broaches the issues of tasks, rights and remuneration of the 
advisory board. First, it explains the responsibilities of supervising, appointing 
and dismissing members of the managing board. In addition, the advisory board 
is in charge of the coordination of tasks and the formation of committees. An 
additional topic in this chapter is the composition of the advisory board, as well 
as the remuneration of its members. Finally, this chapter deals with the targets 
and the efficiency of the advisory board. (Regierungskommission Deutscher 
Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, pp. 9-12.) 
Regulations about the transparency can be found in chapter six, which 
highlights the disclosure obligations and date. (Regierungskommission 
Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, pp. 12-13.) 
The last chapter addresses accounting and the annual audit. Information about 
the compilation of the annual statement of accounts, interim reports and of the 
corporate governance report are provided in this chapter. 
(Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, pp. 13-
14.) 
Both the statutory rules and the guidelines of the DCGK aim at increasing 
transparency for investors and at considering the stakeholders’ interests 
appropriately. In addition, they want to strengthen the role of the board.  
4. Family Business Governance 
4.1 Definition 
The family and the company are described as two separated subsystems, 
which are overlapping (Taguiri & Davis 1996, pp. 200-201). Therefore, the 
governance structure of family businesses also consists of two strongly 
connected subsystems: Business Governance and Family Governance. Both 
systems together are building the family governance system, which is defined 
as the organisation of management and control. Furthermore, family business 
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governance ensures the solidarity of the family. (Koeberle-Schmid, Witt & 
Fahrion 2010, p. 162.)  
As it is shown in Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. the 
amily business governance system can consist of two pillars, the business and 
the family governance. Within the family governance the instruments of family 
activity, family education, family philanthropy and family office are allocated. In 
addition, the conflict management and the family council are also part of this 
pillar. On the other side is the business governance with its instruments internal 
control system, risk management and compliance management. Moreover, it 
includes the management of the company, the advisory board, as well as the 
internal revision. The two parts of family business governance are linked with 
the shareholders’ meeting and the family itself. (Koeberle-Schmid et al. 2012, 
pp. 32-43.) 
 
Figure 3. Family Business Governance system (Koeberle-Schmid, Witt & 
Fahrion 2012, p. 31) 
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However, every family business has to take into account its specific 
requirements. According to Gersick, Davis, Hampton & Lansberg (1997) and 
Sharma & Nordqvist (2008) family companies face different challenges 
regarding family and business and therefore, not all instruments and measures 
of family business governance are suitable for all family businesses (Koeberle-
Schmid et al. 2010, p.163). The companies have rather to decide, which mean 
suits best their necessities. Generally speaking it can be said that with rising 
complexity of the organisational structures within the company and the family, 
the complexity of corporate governance has to increase analogical.  
In the following chapters the objectives, elements and instruments of family 
business governance are explained.  
4.2 Objectives 
Corporate governance in family businesses aims at enhancing the economic 
and emotional value of the company. In addition, with corporate governance the 
company can be successful in the long-term and remain in the hands of the 
family for several generations. The aspect of business governance tends to 
implement transparent and verifiable regulations for the management and the 
control of the company. Therefore, the company should be organised 
professionally according to the business governance scheme. The integration of 
appropriate structures, boards and instruments is dependent on the individual 
situation of the company. (Koeberle-Schmid et al. 2010, p. 162.) 
Moreover, the instruments and measures of the family governance shall 
increase the solidarity of the owner family and strengthen the commitment of 
the individual family members to the company (Heyden, Blondel & Carlock 
2005, p. 2). Due to this strengthened commitment, the probability of conflicts 
within the family and alienation from the company by the family is limited. 
Besides, family governance can create a sense of pride for the company and for 
the belonging to the entrepreneurial family, which represents the emotional 
value. (Koeberle-Schmid et al. 2010, p. 163.) 
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4.3 Elements 
This chapter deals with the question, which elements can be identified for good 
corporate governance. In general the regulations for the composition and 
function of the supervisory board and the management, as well as the duties 
and rights of partners are considered as the most important elements of 
corporate governance.  
4.3.1 Elements of Business Governance 
Executive board 
One of the most important elements of business governance is the 
management or executive board. Chmielewicz (1993) highlights its importance 
within the company and the responsibility for the leadership of the company and 
the achievements of the overall objectives (Ulrich 2011, pp. 137-138). In family 
businesses the management is slightly differing from corporations regarding the 
tasks and the composition of the body (Kenyon-Rouvinez 2012, p. 91). A further 
distinctive aspect is the succession. Consecutively the governance 
specifications for the management are carved out.  
Criteria, which are discussed in the context of composition, include the number 
of members, as well as the distribution of family and non-family managers 
(Werder 2008, pp. 50ff.). The family needs to decide whether the management 
is assigned by family members, external candidates or a mixed board (Kenyon-
Rouvinez 2012, pp. 95-101). The legislative regulates to a great extent the 
composition of the management in different legal forms (§ 76 AktG; § 6 clause 3 
GmbHG; § 125 clause 1 HGB). In a sole proprietorship (e. K.) the director is 
necessarily an owner-manager, while in a general partnership (OHG) all 
partners are participating in the management. (Ulrich 2011, p. 138.) Besides, it 
was emphasised by Hausch (2004) that for the legal forms of limited liability 
companies (GmbH), joint-stock companies (AG) and the limited partnership with 
a limited liability company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG) no exact 
structures are mandatory, disregarding the co-determination in GmbH and AG 
of a certain size (Ulrich 2011, p. 138). However, medium-sized family 
businesses are mainly led by the owners in the legal forms of GmbH, GmbH & 
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Co. KG or sole proprietorship (Espel 2008, p. 28; Janssen 2009, p. 14). 
Therefore, only a few medium-sized family businesses are led by external 
managers. Nevertheless, it is proven that with rising size the separation of 
management and ownership is more common (Becker, Fischer, Staffel & Ulrich 
2008, pp. 40ff.; Eckert 2008, p. 304; Reinemann & Böschen 2008, p. 16).  
Reasons for an external candidate at the management positions are manifold. 
First of all, there might be no suitable internal candidate from the family. This 
can be either due to lacking competencies or that there is no one available or 
prepared to overtake this position within the family. In addition, scarce 
motivation can also be a reason for family members to refuse the succession. It 
has to be considered that directors of family businesses often keep their 
position for several decades and therefore, they have to be motivated to fulfil 
their tasks for such a long time. A further reason to assign an external manager 
instead of a family member as the director can be family rivalry. In all these 
cases an external manager is the best solution. However, it has to be assured 
that the candidate matches with the company regarding the values and 
competencies. (Kenyon-Rouvinez 2012, pp. 98-99.) 
Supervisory Boards  
The concept of management control is a further aspect of corporate governance 
in family businesses. It can be described as the extent of formalised control on 
the business operations. Control can be either exerted by personal contact or 
institutionalised management control. Formal supervisory boards have a large 
influence on the long-term development of a company and support the success 
and protection of the family business by advising and controlling the 
management. (Ulrich 2011, p. 140; Koeberle-Schmid & Lorz 2012, p. 120.) 
According to Ward (1991) supervisory boards have several benefits for family 
companies with fifty or more employees. First of all, the executive board is 
supported by external experience, expertise and independent opinions. The 
board members also help to evaluate different options within the strategic 
planning and support the succession process by electing suitable candidates. 
Furthermore, a supervisory board fosters discipline, responsibility and 
accountability of the management. Moreover, the board can help to implement 
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the values and objectives, as well as strategic decisions in the company. 
(Koeberle-Schmid & Lorz 2012, pp. 120-121.) In addition, such boards make 
sure that the interests of owners and managers are aligned (Fama & Jensen 
1983, p. 309). However, only 50 to 60 percent of all family businesses with 100 
to 5 000 employees do have a supervisory board (Achenbach, May & Rieder 
2009, p. 50 ; Becker, Reker & Ulrich 2010, p. 154.) 
In practice there are several boards, which are all summarised as supervisory 
boards. This includes the advisory board, board of directors and board of 
administration. All of them have different legal obligations and requirements, as 
well as tasks and compositions. The most important boards for medium-sized 
family companies are the board of directors and the advisory board and can be 
either obligatory or voluntarily established. Hausch (2004) stated that 
mandatory boards play a rather inferior role for medium-sized family businesses 
due to the predominant legal forms. Therefore, the facultative supervisory 
boards are of greater importance. (Ulrich 2011, p. 141.) The board of directors 
is legally binding for the legal forms of AG and the GmbH. However, more than 
500 employees are needed in the legal form of a GmbH. (AktG, § 76 BetrVG) 
The GmbH & Co. KG is obliged to establish a board of directors if the GmbH 
employs more than 500 people (§ 77 BetrVG 1952 & § 129 BetrVG 1972). In 
most cases the GmbH only assumes control and liability. However, it is also 
mandatory for a GmbH & Co. Kg to establish a board of directors in case the 
GmbH and KG have more than 2 000 employees and the GmbH is the only 
partner liable to unlimited extent. Furthermore, most of the limited partners of 
the KG also possess the majority of shares of the GmbH and the GmbH has no 
business operations of its own or less than 500 employees. (§ 1 MitbestG & § 4 
MitbestG.)  
For medium-sized family businesses obligatory boards are mainly irrelevant, as 
they only have up to 499 employees. Therefore, the establishment of facultative 
boards is possible (§ 52 GmbHG). In case the company does not determine 
special regulations regarding the function and tasks of the board, the existing 
stock corporation law is applied (Lange 2009, p. 250). Furthermore, Werner 
(2006) highlights that the advisory board is an additional board, which exists 
besides the shareholders’ meeting and management board in a GmbH and 
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besides the annual stockholders meeting, the managing board and board of 
directors of an AG (Ulrich 2011, p. 143). Advisory boards are either integrated 
(statuary) or in personam (obligatory) (Fabis 2007, p. 356). Ruter & Thümmel 
(2009) explained that statuary boards are based on the memorandum of 
association and are thus an additional body of the company, while the 
obligatory board is only obliged to contractual agreements (Ulrich 2011, p. 143). 
Moreover, an advisory board in medium-sized family businesses has slightly 
different tasks than a board of directors in a large-scale company. Ruter & 
Thümmel (2009) described their function as supporting the management by 
advising, monitoring and assisting in the strategic planning (Ulrich 2011, p. 
143). Besides, Ruter (2009) and Klein (2009) highlighted that such a board has 
decision-making competencies and acts as an agent between company and 
family (Ulrich 2011, p. 143). Despite the mentioned advantages of supervisory 
boards, in the majority of medium-sized family businesses the control is exerted 
directly by the owners and partners of the company (Becker, Baltzer & Ulrich 
2008, p. 59). Hausch (2004) added that they prefer the direct control due to 
lower costs and their own good position regarding the information supply, while 
Becker, Baltzer & Ulrich (2010) analysed that in companies, which are led by 
externals, boards support the management in most cases (Ulrich 2011, p.144). 
Annual auditor 
Theisen (2008) stated that the annual auditing of a company can be seen as a 
further aspect of corporate governance (Ulrich 2011, p. 148).  Besides the 
auditing of annual financial statements, an auditor can also be responsible and 
estimated by the companies for tax advice and economic consultations. 
Therefore auditors support family businesses in various ways. (Grottel 2012, p. 
161.) 
A statutory audit is obligatory for capital market-oriented companies (§ 315a 
HGB) and for companies, which are obliged to generate consolidated financial 
statements (§ 290 paragraph 1 HGB; § 11 PublG), while all other companies 
independently of their legal form, size and other legal obligations are free to 
appoint voluntarily an annual auditor. (Grottel 2012, p.166.) Reasons, which 
argue for an optional audit, are the conditions of financing by outside creditors 
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or regulations in the articles of the company. A voluntary audit is always 
reasonable if the fragmentation of the family increases and minority 
shareholders have to be protected. (Grottel 2012, p.166.)  
In order to carve out the role of the annual auditor in family businesses, they are 
categorised in different types. Locally oriented family businesses focus mainly 
on their direct region and the family runs and manage the company on their 
own. Furthermore, these companies are mostly non-incorporated firms without 
subsidiaries. Therefore, they have no auditing duty and normally these kinds of 
companies do not consider voluntary audits. Examples are small craft 
enterprises or hotels and restaurants. (Grottel 2012, pp.162-167.) Regionally 
and nationally active family companies concentrate their business operations 
mainly on their home country and region. In addition, the family is still in charge. 
However, in these companies there can be a duty for obligatory audits. This is 
dependent on the size or existence of subsidiaries. A further type of family 
business is the internationally active family firm, which is increasingly complex, 
but still not capital market-oriented. Due to the complexity the management is 
often led by externals. Most of these companies might have an auditing duty. 
The GKFU recommends that family companies establish voluntarily the annual 
auditing. (Kommission Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen 2010, p. 
18; Grottel 2012, pp.162-167.) As large-scale family enterprises are not the 
object of investigation in this thesis, the internationally and capital market-
orientated types of family businesses are not further analysed in this chapter. 
The same is applied to exact details about the procedure of the annual audit of 
financial statements. 
4.3.2 Elements of Family Governance 
Shareholders’ general meeting 
Depending on the legal form family companies have different regulations for the 
shareholder’s general meeting. For a GmbH and AG the legislation has detailed 
requirements. For the GmbH the shareholder’s general meeting is the highest 
decision-making unit with an extensive authority to give directions towards the 
management. The authority in a GmbH & Co. KG implements also the decision 
and operations of the KG. In contrast, the annual stockholders meeting of the 
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AG has no direct influence on the decisions of the board. The advisory board is 
just responsible for the appointment and dismissal of the executive board and 
gives advice and monitors the board. (Groß, Redlefsen & Witt 2012, p. 295.) In 
general partnerships (OHG, KG, GmbH & Co. KG) the law has not allocated 
any competencies to the shareholder’s general meeting. Therefore, the partners 
of general partnerships have to define regulations and formalities of the 
shareholder’s general meeting. (Groß, Redlefsen & Witt 2012, p. 296.) 
In general, every partner and shareholder has the right to attend the 
shareholders’ general meeting. Their right to vote conforms to their number of 
shares. Further rights include the determination of values, objectives, 
organisational structure and legal form, as well as the development of a 
memorandum of association. In addition, all partners are responsible to elect 
and dismiss the members of a potential advisory board and determine their 
remuneration and approval. They also decide about capital increase and the 
acceptance of new shareholders. Besides these legal rights of the partners, 
they can determine further principles, which are suited to the economic and 
family situation of the family company. In many cases, they change the 
necessary majorities for certain decisions. However, the partners have also 
different duties, which they have to comply with. This includes the loyalty 
towards the family company, confidentiality and restraint on competition. In 
many family companies the partners have to negotiate a marriage contract and 
have to make a will. (Groß, Redlefsen & Witt 2012, pp. 296-299.) 
Family governance bodies 
Within the family business governance system five different types of bodies with 
different tasks can be identified (Table 4). First of all, the family council is a 
body, which is only responsible for the strengthening of relationships. The 
council has no decision rights towards the institutions of the company. In 
addition, it is mainly occupied with communication and organisation tasks. This 
includes the organisation of family activities to strengthen and increase the 
relationships and solidarity of the family members. (Brockhoff & Koeberle-
Schmid 2012, pp. 331-333.) 
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Table 4. Types and tasks of family governance bodies (Brockhoff & Koeberle-
Schmid, p. 332.) 
Besides the strengthening of the relationships, the family representation is in 
charge of the assurance of the family property. In particular when the family is 
not represented in the management, a family representation can help to prevent 
the sale of company shares to third parties. In addition, the representation can 
handle and accompany the exit of partners. (Brockhoff & Koeberle-Schmid 
2012, pp. 333-334.) 
If the family is represented by a shareholders’ committee besides an advisory 
board, it is a shareholders’ committee type one. The shareholder’s general 
meeting assigns decision and consulting tasks to this body in order to influence 
important decisions by the whole family. This can include decisions under time 
pressure, decisions about complex issues or other important strategic 
decisions. This body should be fixed as an institution of the company, as it 
possesses much more power than the family council or family representation. 
Therefore, the members of such shareholder committees need to have a 
greater expertise than the members of family councils or representations. 
(Brockhoff & Koeberle-Schmid 2012, pp. 334-336.) 
According to Zahra & Pearce (1989), Forbes & Milliken (1999), Huse (2005, 
2007) and Koeberle-Schmid (2008) the shareholder committee type two has 
further control and monitoring tasks than type one, because the family company 
does not have an advisory board. In particular smaller companies often do not 
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have an advisory board (Montemerlo, Gnan, Schulze & Corbetta 2008, p. 2). 
Besides the other already mentioned tasks, this type is responsible for the 
appointment and dismissal of the management. (Brockhoff & Koeberle-Schmid 
2012, pp. 336-337.) 
Finally, the owners of family enterprises can affiliate in a pool with 25 percent or 
more to use § 13 of the Erbschaftsteuergesetz (§ 13 ErbStG). In this case the 
owners are exempted from the capital transfer tax. Furthermore, a pool can 
bundle the interests of different family roots. The pooling is especially important 
when externals participate in the management of the family company and to 
defend the company as a family company. (Brockhoff & Koeberle-Schmid 2012, 
pp. 337-339.) 
4.4 Instruments 
4.4.1 Instruments of Business Governance 
Nowadays companies are facing with their business operations a dynamic 
environment and constantly changing conditions. Therefore, the requirements 
for control and transparency are rising and governance instruments for 
improving management and control gain importance. Family businesses also 
face these challenges and cannot elude this development (Brenken 2006, pp. 
19ff.). Risk management, compliance management, the internal control system 
and internal audit are the main instruments for good corporate governance and 
are highlighted in this chapter. (Fahrion, Käufl & Hein 2012, p.197.) 
Corporate governance cannot be limited only to contractual agreements and 
internal regulations for the management and supervisory board, but it has to be 
applied to all levels and processes of the business. (Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 199.) 
Many companies already have recognised the value of governance instruments, 
as they increase transparency, flexibility and information and process security. 
However, in medium-sized family companies there is often a lack of governance 
instruments, but new legal provisions have an influence on them and direct 
them towards an increased application of business governance instruments. 
The legislative body implemented the BilMoG, which claims the monitoring of 
the internal control system, risk management and the internal revision by the 
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board of directors (§ 107 paragraph 3 Sentence 2 AktG). The previous 
regulations from the KonTraG or the DCGK are mainly for stock corporations, 
but the BilMoG is obligatory for stock corporations and co-determined limited 
liability companies. (Fahrion et al. 2012, p.198.) 
The significance of business governance instruments for family businesses is 
dependent on the different kinds of family businesses and the varying 
objectives. To analyse the family companies, they are classified in owner-run or 
completely family-run companies, family companies, which are led by family 
members, but not all members are represented in the management and finally 
large family dynasties with total or partial external management. Furthermore, 
there are different motivational factors, which lead to the implementation of 
business governance instruments in family businesses. Legal obligations, 
pressure from the capital market, avoidance of liability risks for the institution, 
the protection of company assets and improvement of processes and decision-
making are the driving forces for family companies to implement risk and 
compliance management, as well as an internal control system and internal 
audit. As it can be seen in Table 5 business governance instruments are more 
likely implemented the more the ownership and management structures are 
adapted to corporations. (Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 200-204.) 
The principal-agent conflict, which lays the foundation for the business 
governance instruments, is dependent on the management structure in family 
companies. The pressure of company owners is higher, if the management is 
done by externals. In case the owner and manager are identical in a family 
business, the principal-agent conflict only exists, if there are other partners. In 
addition, in family-owned companies with an external management, the 
principal-agent conflict exists between the external management and the owner 
family. However, this principal-agent relationship is weaker than in corporations, 
because the information asymmetries are smaller. Moreover, family members 
with a large number of shares have a greater incentive to gather information, as 
their wealth results from the corporate value. This effect was highlighted by 
Kirchdörfer & Kögel (2000) and Peemöller (2006) (Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 202). 
Due to this fact business governance has a different focus in family companies 
than in corporations. While in large-scale enterprises external driving forces, like 
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legal obligations and the threat of opportunistic behaviour, are mainly the 
reason for the implementation of business governance instruments, in family 
businesses these means are more directed towards the protection of company 
assets and the sustainable economic development. This is particularly important 
for family businesses as they often have invested a major share of their fortune 
in the company. (Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 200-204.) 
Furthermore, the improvement of decision-making and the increase of 
transparency within the company are also essential for family companies. Risk 
management, compliance management, internal control system and internal 
audit can serve the management, supervisory board and the family members by 
evaluating the economic and financial situation. Lange (2005) figured out that 
the instruments help to raise efficiency and effectiveness of the business 
operations and to reduce the threat of entrepreneurial mistakes (Fahrion et al. 
2012, p. 203). In general it can be said that family businesses are mainly 
internally driven to implement business governance instruments.  (Fahrion et al. 
2012, pp. 200-204.) Due to the fact that the decisions made in family 
businesses are mainly based on intuition, Lange (2005) assumed that the 
business governance instruments are in many cases not developed and used 
sufficiently (Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 204). However, the smaller a family company 
is the lower the monitoring and controlling needs are. (Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 
204-205.) 
 
Table 5. Driving forces of business governance instruments (Fahrion et al. 
2012, p. 202) 
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Risk management 
According to the IDW-Prüfungstandard 340 (2000) the term risk describes the 
possibility of an unfavourable deviance of the expected or forecasted result 
(Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 205). In the economy risks are often a measure to 
determine the uncertainty about the occurrence of future assumptions. 
Therefore, risk management aims at increasing the transparency of the risk 
situation of the company and to identify deviations and risk potentials to actively 
promote countermeasures. A structured risk analysis is the basis of the risk 
management system, which identifies essential risks. Essential risks are those, 
which threaten the development or even the existence of the company. Major 
risks of family companies are often the loss of technical superiority and the loss 
of and dependence on key accounts, as well as credit risks and IT risks. The 
major risks are determined by the management and if existing with the board. 
With the determined kind of risks the company conducts recurrent evaluations 
of the risk situation by calculating the occurrence probability and vulnerability of 
the identified risks.  
Furthermore, the risk evaluation always has to be linked to the annual planning, 
as the risks have to be considered in the planning. The next step is the 
determination of measures to control the risks. However, this does not 
necessarily mean to avoid the risks, but rather to consciously take the risks. 
Detailed information is summarised in the risk reporting and then communicated 
to the management and supervisory board. To cope with the high requirements 
of risk management the companies should implement a firm risk organisation 
with given roles, responsibilities and tasks. (Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 205-208.) 
Internal Control System 
The internal control system is a further instrument of business governance and 
consists of principles, processes and measures in order to form business 
processes safely and correctly. The IDW-Prüfungsstandard 261 (2006) stated 
that the internal control system, therefore, has a major impact on the assurance 
of efficiency and effectiveness of the company (Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 208). In 
addition, the internal control system can either refer to financial accounting or 
the whole company. The internal control system, which focuses on financial 
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accounting, considers processes, which assure a correct financial reporting. In 
contrast, the company-referring internal control system transcends it and 
includes operative processes, which have no direct impact on financial 
reporting. Moreover, this system considers the conformity of all processes with 
established requirements regarding the efficiency and effectiveness, as well as 
with legal obligations. (Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 208-209.) 
The content of the internal control system is determined by the specific risks of 
a company. This shows the imperative connection between risk management 
and the internal control system, as the necessary control mechanisms can only 
be determined by knowing the risks of a company. Certain control mechanisms, 
such as auditing of accounts or the authorisation of payment runs are 
necessary for the basic compliance of each company, but besides companies 
possess individual risks, which require the focus on those aspects. Controls, 
which are part of regular processes, are summarised as control activities. This 
includes approval, authorisations and coordination. Further means of control are 
the code of conduct or specific guidelines for purchasing or investments. 
(Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 209-210.) 
Clear and binding regulations for procedures, responsibilities and competencies 
are the foundation of an internal control system. Therefore, transparent 
guidelines for the essential areas and processes of a company are important 
elements of the control system. Besides, key controls should exist, like the four-
eyes principle or the control of preliminary calculations, for the execution of 
central or sensitive transactions. Automated controls extend the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the internal control system. Such controls can be the limitation 
of access authorisations or credit limits. These examples seem to be self-
evident, but with rising pressure such controls are sometimes neglected. 
(Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 210-211.) 
Finally, a good internal control system also comprises mechanisms to monitor 
the efficiency of the control system. Critical overall analyses should examine the 
completeness, convenience and adherence of the internal control system. The 
on-going identification of weaknesses, status reports and efficiency ratings 
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make sure that the internal control system is always up-to-date. (Fahrion et al. 
2012, p. 211.) 
However, Bungartz & Szackamer (2007) figured out that in small and medium-
sized companies internal control systems are rarely implemented (Ulrich 2011, 
p. 149), but nevertheless the significance and implementation of an internal 
control system is constantly rising in such companies (Möller & Pfaff 2007, pp. 
49ff.; Pfaff & Ruud 2007, pp. 445ff.). 
Compliance Management 
Companies in general are facing an increasing number of regulations and laws, 
which they have to obey. Therefore, the threat of violation against those rules is 
also growing and companies have to bear the consequences of non-
compliance. These consequences can be fines, economic damage due to a 
loss of reputation or costs of external legal advice. Furthermore, members of 
the management or supervisory board might also be personally liable for 
damage, resulting from poor compliance. 
The term compliance describes the accordance with all laws, regulations and 
guidelines, as well as with contractual and voluntarily disposed commitments. 
According to Engels & Schröder (2009) compliance management aims to 
develop and implement principles and moral concepts in an organisation 
(Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 212). In the catalogue of duties the specific duties with 
correspondent risks are summarised and is the result of an analysis of 
compliance risks. The issues of export control, competition, environmental and 
product duties, as well as internal duties and corruption prevention might be 
part of such a catalogue of duties. The main points of the catalogue are 
transferred to a so-called code of conduct, which can be seen as a guideline for 
employees and a communication means for external purposes. Due to the 
discovered risks there might be specific measures or instructions to prevent 
compliance violations. The principles and duties have to be regularly 
communicated and the employees have to be trained. In addition, the 
compliance management is responsible for the fostering of compliant behaviour 
by providing incentives. (Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 212-213.) 
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Internal Audit 
The internal audit provides information that increases transparency and limits 
information asymmetries (Becker & Ulrich 2010, p. 16ff.). Furthermore, it 
supports as an internal business governance instrument for management and 
control bodies. The internal audit analyses the effectiveness of management 
and monitoring processes, risk management and the internal control system. 
(Geis 2012, pp. 228-229.) 
This instrument aims to support the organisation in the achievement of their 
objectives and contributes to the assurance of staying a family business and to 
the long-term increase of corporate value. In addition, the internal audit 
examines whether the financial and operative information is reliable, the 
processes are effective and efficient and whether the laws, regulations, 
contracts, ethical norms and values are followed. (Geis 2012, pp. 228-229.) The 
management can use the results of the internal audit to prove that they have 
made their decisions on the basis of appropriate information. Furthermore, the 
implementation of an internal audit directs employees to behave properly, as 
the menace of sanctions is otherwise given. (Geis 2012, pp. 231-232.) 
The implementation of the internal audit is dependent on the organisational 
development and the management and ownership structure. When the 
structures become more complex, an internal audit might be necessary. 
Furthermore, the internal audit needs to be implemented in a way that assures 
the organisational independence and the personal objectivity. In German 
enterprises with the dualistic system, the internal audit should report to the 
executive management. In addition, the internal audit needs employees, who 
have the necessary expertise and professional accuracy. (Geis 2012, pp. 236-
240.) 
Possible tasks of the internal audit include financial, compliance, operational, 
and management auditing or internal consulting. Financial auditing comprises 
the analysis of the financial situation and the reliability of the financial 
accounting, while compliance audits aim to examine the correctness and 
compliance with laws, contracts and internal guidelines. Besides, the 
operational auditing checks structures, processes and system and the 
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management auditing traces back the management efforts regarding strategies 
and objectives. Eventually, the analysis of projects and processes and the 
advice are part of the internal consulting. (Geis 2012, p. 242.) 
4.4.2 Instruments of Family Governance 
The entrepreneurial family goes beyond normal families, as they have a 
common project that ties them together. In addition, not all family members 
belong automatically to the entrepreneurial family, because this membership is 
determined by the ownership. With this ownership duties and rights are linked, 
in particular the right for information and dividends, as well as the duty to 
behave professionally regarding the company. Therefore there are three major 
challenges for the entrepreneurial family. The members have to act like 
professional owners and there should be a unity among the individuals 
regarding the company. Furthermore, such families have to consider their 
entrepreneurial responsibility to give something back to the society. To meet 
these challenges the family governance instruments of family activity, family 
education and family philanthropy exist. (Peter, Rieder, Störmann & Koeberle-
Schmid 2012, pp. 363-365.) 
With the family governance instruments of family activity, family education and 
family philanthropy, the emotional value of the company increases for the family 
and the family can become a relevant resource for the success of the company. 
According to Zelleweger & Sieger (2009) and Björnberg & Nicholson (2009) a 
strong emotional value is defined as pride to belong to the entrepreneurial 
family and includes shared values and a common strategy for the ownership, 
good relationships within the family and a lack of conflicts. (Peter et al. 2012, p. 
369.) The instruments have to be implemented in a way that they are adequate 
for the different companies. Each family has to decide by themselves what is 
important for them. In less complex family businesses it might be enough to 
meet twice a year for a dinner, while in cousin-owned family companies the 
need for frequent activities might be evident. Generally speaking it can be said 
that with the growing number of family members, the need for family 
governance instruments is also increasing. (Peter et al. 2012, pp. 366, 371.) 
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Family activity 
Family activity can be defined as the activities and measures, which are 
executed by the entrepreneurial family to increase and strengthen the 
relationships, the solidarity and the identification with the company and the 
family. (Peter et al. 2012, p. 364) The major reason to conduct family activities 
is the objective to strengthen the solidarity in a way that the members see 
themselves as a unity. Heraeus (2009) stated that emotions between family 
members, and not the dividends, cause the solidarity and strong connection 
between partners and the company (Peter et al. 2012, p. 365). Furthermore, he 
pointed out that families are mostly motivated by the goal to pull together the 
family and to align the interests of the family and the company. (Peter et al. 
2012, p. 365.)  
Morris and Pearl (2010) emphasised that strong families can be recognised by 
certain characteristics. First of all, the members of the entrepreneurial family 
have identified and determined shared values and objectives, according to 
which they live and which are passed on to the next generations. Trust and 
respect are important values in this context. Moreover, the family can be 
distinguished by specific traditions from other families. The individual members 
are also willing to learn. Besides, all members try to participate in common 
activities and support each other wherever possible. Finally, there are clear 
borders between the members of the entrepreneurial family. (Peter et al. 2012, 
pp. 365-366.) Family activities can include the framework programme for the 
shareholders’ general meeting with a common evening event and short 
lectures. A further possibility is a family meeting or family weekend, where the 
family undertakes a visit to a theatre, a walking-tour or other special events. 
(Peter et al. 2012, p. 373.) 
Family education 
The term family education summarises the measures, which aim at increasing 
the knowledge about the company and the family. This also includes the duties 
and rights as a professional owner of a family company. (Peter et al. 2012, p. 
365.) Furthermore, the instrument of family education aims to increase the 
professionalism of the entrepreneurial family regarding the ownership (Carlock 
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& Ward 2001, p. 143). However, only 30 percent of all German entrepreneurial 
families have recognized the importance to educate their members (Papesch 
2010, p. 149). Family education is also needed, because the knowledge and 
expertise is unequally distributed in most family companies. According to May & 
Rieder (2006) the managing partner knows the company, but potential co-
partners and other family members might not have learned to evaluate and 
understand the economic connection, strategies and financing options (Peter et 
al. 2012, p. 367). May, Redlefsen & Haller (2004) stated that only around 30 
percent of all passive partners possess knowledge and expertise about the 
particular sector and 40 percent are able to evaluate financial statements. 
These facts might have negative consequences as the majority of shares are 
possessed by passive partners. (Peter et al. 2012, p. 372.) In addition, family 
education can contribute to the formation of young partners and prepare them 
for their future managerial functions. (Peter et al. 2012, p. 367.) 
Family philanthropy 
Family philanthropy is the third family governance instrument and it is defined 
as the common social commitment, based on the shared values of the family. 
(Peter et al. 2012, p. 364.) May, Eiben & Peter (2008) analysed that 44 percent 
of the entrepreneurial families in Germany are engaged as corporate citizens. 
Mostly they are motivated by the wish to return a part of their success to the 
society. Economic reasons to be socially committed are not that important for 
these companies. (Peter et al. 2012, p. 368) May, Eiben & Peter (2008) also 
highlighted that today most entrepreneurial families are engaged in the field of 
education, followed by the commitment for art and culture or sports (Peter et al. 
2012, p. 370). Besides that, they start their social commitment in the region 
where they come from and extend it gradually (Peter et al. 2012, p. 390). 
Family office 
Wealthy entrepreneurial families traditionally use financial and investment 
services for their assets. However, these services are mainly restricted to 
monetary aspects. Family offices, in comparison, are specialised in offering 
services in the material and immaterial asset management, as well as in 
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financial, tax and legal advice, in succession planning and lifestyle 
management. (Eiben 2012, pp. 405, 407.) 
Furthermore, these offices can be either single family offices or multi-family 
offices that are in charge of several families. The offices that are only 
responsible for one family can concentrate fully on the needs and objectives of 
their client. In contrast, multi-family offices either belong to a bank or are an 
independent service provider. Therefore, they have reduced costs, but they 
cannot consider the individual requirements completely. (Eiben 2012, p. 407.) 
Furthermore, Prinz (2006) stated that banks often limit the access to their asset 
management service to clients with a certain wealth level, which can be 
significantly above the wealth level of other family offices (Eiben 2012, p. 408). 
The objectives and tasks of single family offices vary with the client structure, as 
the increasing number of generations also increases the heterogeneity of the 
family. Nevertheless, single family offices regularly serve the pursuance of 
monetary and non-monetary objectives. Furthermore, they support the social 
commitment and the education of family members and family solidarity. Single 
family offices also aim to preserve capital, maintain liquidity and apply tax 
compliance. Moreover, the strengthening of solidarity, the acquaintance of the 
next generation to the company and the pursuance of shared objectives, as well 
as the securing of the social status are further goals of a single family office. 
(Eiben 2012, pp. 410-412.)  
It is estimated that in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Liechtenstein and 
Luxembourg there are between several hundred and more than thousand single 
family offices, which are in charge of a high three-figure multi billion Euro 
fortune. (Eiben 2012, p. 406) However, as single family offices are the most 
expensive form of these offices, they are not economically feasible for every 
entrepreneurial family. Therefore, the family should possess at least a fortune of 
250 million euros. This is due to the fact that the office has significant costs of 
foundation and operation. In particular the costs of operation add up to 500 000 
euros per year for salaries and infrastructure. Besides, there are additional 
administrative costs, like remunerations for external service providers. (Eiben 
2012, p. 410.) 
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Conflict management 
Conflict management in family companies is needed, because conflicts are part 
and parcel of all social interactions. The family in particular faces numerous 
kinds of conflicts and helps to learn the dealing with conflicts (Schneewind 
2009, pp. 12-23). Moreover, Regnet (2001) stated that conflicts in organisations 
are inevitable (Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, p. 429). However, it has to be 
emphasised that conflicts are not always negative and therefore the striving for 
a conflict-free organisational culture is not needed (Jehn 1995, p. 256; 
Kellermanns & Eddleston 2004, p. 210). It is rather the challenge to determine 
destructrive conflicts and prevent the escalation of conflicts. Due to the 
overlapping systems of family, company and ownership the complexity is quite 
high. This does not necessarily lead to conflicts, but the probability is 
increasing. (Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, pp. 429-431.) In addition, objective 
conflicts can change quickly into emotional or relationship conflicts (Kaye 1996; 
Schlippe & Kellermanns 2008, p. 41).  
Family companies are facing several kinds of conflicts, such as objective 
conflicts or evaluating conflicts, as well as process conflicts. However, conflicts 
are not a threat before the emotional level predominates. At this point the 
involved parties are more aware of winning or losing instead of the underlying 
object. Emotional conflicts can hinder the decision-making processes and limit 
the success of a company (Jehn 1995, p. 258; 1997, p. 531; Eddleston & 
Kellermanns 2007, p. 548). While emotional conflicts are a major threat for 
family businesses, the other forms of conflicts can have a positive impact on the 
company’s success. (Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, p. 430.) Process conflicts 
arise when people have different opinions how to achieve an objective. This 
kind of conflict can change into a relationship conflict, when for example in the 
succession planning a family member is favoured due to his or her belonging to 
the family, even if external candidates would be more suitable for managing 
position. In this case external managers in the company might feel to be 
unjustly treated and this preference can have a negative impact on his or her 
performance. Furthermore, family members might be disappointed due to 
unfulfilled promises. (Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, pp. 431-432.)  
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In addition, family businesses are facing cognitive conflicts, which are factual 
disagreements about objectives and strategies (Jehn & Bendersky 2003, p. 
198). These conflicts can help to determine stumbling blocks and to develop 
long-term objectives and strategies. Participative strategic disagreements and 
cognitive conflicts positively support the success of the company and minimise 
opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, this kind of conflict can limit negative 
governance costs. (Kellermanns & Eddleston 2007, pp. 1049, 1050.)  According 
to Harvey & Evans (1994) and Levinson (1971) emotional conflicts are much 
more likely to appear and develop in family businesses, as the family members 
cannot easily leave the company (Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, p. 433). They 
stay a member of the family. Therefore, entrepreneurial families continuously 
need to balance the relationships within the family and the company. 
(Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, p. 433.) Emotional conflicts have severe 
impacts not only on the family, but also on the company. These conflicts 
alienate employees who deviate from their work. Besides, they limit courtesy 
and agreement and as well, they increase trouble, stress, hostile behaviour and 
antagonistic motives. (Jehn 1997, p. 557; Simons & Peterson 2000, p. 103.) To 
sum up, relationship or emotional conflicts are a major challenge for family 
businesses, as they foster opportunistic behaviour and concealed objectives. 
Due to a lack of consensus the decision-making ability and the implementation 
of strategies are limited. (Kellermanns & Eddleston 2004, p. 213; Kellermanns, 
Walter, Lechner & Floyd 2005, p. 725.) 
As mentioned above, conflicts can have severe negative impacts on the family 
and the company; therefore Wiechers (2005) demanded that conflict 
management should be an essential part of corporate governance (Kellermanns 
& Schlippe 2012, p. 435). Conflicts can be either avoided or enforced; the 
parties can compromise, cooperate or involve an external mediator 
(Kellermanns & Eddleston 2006, p. 360). The avoidance of conflicts in any form 
is a frequent reaction in family companies, but they are only delayed. At the 
same time, trust is declining and dissatisfaction and rivalry are increasing. 
Therefore, delayed conflicts can erase certainty at critical points, for example 
when the founder dies. (Kaye 1991; Kellermanns & Eddleston 2006, p. 360.)  
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Furthermore, the enforcement of a solution is a further possible reaction to face 
conflicts. This is mainly done by the patriarch. In external conflicts it can be a 
possibility to create clarity, but in internal conflicts this might affect the 
relationships negatively. The solving of conflicts by compromise does not satisfy 
either of the parties and those solutions are not ideal, but it can help to reduce 
emotional conflicts. Besides, conflicts can be best solved by cooperation of the 
involved parties. Both sides work together to try and find a satisfying option to 
generate trust, communication and support. Finally, the mediation by third 
parties is also a solution. However, family businesses tend to be quite 
suspicious of external advice, but it should not be immediately excluded. 
(Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, p. 436) These are some options how family 
businesses can cope with conflicts, but each family company has to find out the 
best options for them. Nevertheless, Schlippe & Klein (2010) highlighted that 
conflict management cannot prevent all conflicts, as the social life is not fully 
projectable and the family is a complex and fragile system (Kellermanns & 
Schlippe 2012, p. 437). 
In addition, possible conflicts cannot only be solved, but also be hindered in 
their development. Possible prevention instruments include a memorandum of 
association with explicit conflict guidelines, an external or mixed supervisory 
board and an annually elected shareholder committee. Furthermore, a family 
business governance constitution and family activities increases solidarity and 
improve relationships. (Kellermanns & Schlippe 2012, pp. 437-438.) 
4.5 Family Business Governance constitution 
Successful family companies should consider the implementation of a family 
business governance constitution, which defines their governance principles. 
However, only one quarter of all German family businesses have implemented 
a constitution to create trust and solidarity and to formulate the aim of keeping 
the company in family hands. Furthermore, a constitution can help to avoid 
conflicts, prevent succession problems and foster professional behaviour. The 
constitution also increases transparency, fairness, professionalism, verifiability, 
solidarity and assures the long-term increase of the economic and emotional 
value of the family company. The family companies, which have developed a 
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family business governance constitution, are significantly more satisfied than 
those without a respective constitution. Nevertheless, such a constitution is not 
legally binding and is non-enforceable unless the regulations are transferred to 
a memorandum of association. (Schween, Koeberle-Schmid, Bartels & Hack 
2011, pp. 12-39; Koeberle-Schmid, Witt & Fahrion 2012a, pp. 478-479.) 
The family business governance constitution consists of the objectives and 
values of the family, the company and owners. In addition, there are guidelines 
for the rights and duties, as well as for the tasks and responsibilities of the 
different governance elements and instruments defined. The content of a family 
business governance constitution is aligned with the family business 
governance system. Moreover, the constitution has to be developed by the 
family in a collective process with support from external consultants and 
specialists and has to be adapted to changing circumstances. (Schween, 
Koeberle-Schmid, Bartels & Hack 2011, pp. 12-39; Koeberle-Schmid, Witt & 
Fahrion 2012a, p. 479.) 
4.6 Corporate Governance Code for Family businesses in Germany 
The DCGK and the legislative authority protect the shareholders of listed 
companies with various laws and regulations (Regierungskommission 
Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2014, p. 1). However, for medium-
sized family businesses this approach is not anticipated. It does not seem that 
the family of a family-owned company is in need of protection by the 
government. Nevertheless, since year 2003 private initiatives are set to improve 
corporate governance in family businesses. (Ulrich 2011, p. 107.) 
In 2004 the first version of the Governance-Kodex für Familienunternehmen 
(GKFU) was published by „INTES Akademie für Familienunternehmen GmbH” 
and the German newspaper “Welt am Sonntag” (Kommission Governance 
Kodex für Familienunternehmen 2010, p. 2). In contrast to the DCGK the GKFU 
is a private initiative and in the commission, which sets up the code, many 
family entrepreneurs are represented. The code aims to provide guidelines for 
the responsible management of family companies, both for the enterprise and 
the family (Grottel, Kieser, Helfmann, Rau & Kettenring 2012, p. 153). The code 
was revised in 2010 and the differences between the GKFU and DCGK are 
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showed quite plainly in the amendment (Koeberle-Schmid, Witt & Fahrion 2010, 
p.161-169). In contrary to the DCGK the code for family businesses is not 
legally binding. This stems from the fact that family businesses have different 
legal forms, sizes, financing means and ownership structures. By 
acknowledging this heterogeneity the code should be applicable for all kinds of 
family companies. Furthermore, not all topics, which are considered in the 
DCGK, are relevant for family businesses. (Grottel et al. 2012, p. 153.)  
4.6.1 Structure of the “Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen” 
The “Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen” (GKFU) is similarly 
arranged like the DCGK. Its main topics are the ownership, the advisory board 
and management, as well as the result analysis and the distribution of profits. 
Further information is given about the transferability of the ownership and the 
designation. Finally the code highlights the family governance. 
In the preamble the commission states the necessity of a separate code for 
family businesses, as these companies have different legal forms, sizes with 
varying financing and ownership structures. Family businesses need a 
governance structure, which is focusing on both the company and the family. 
Therefore, the code aims more to ensure the responsible exertion of influence 
by the owners on the company and the integration of the family as an important 
part in the company than to protect powerless investors. Moreover, the code 
addresses family companies, which strive towards a long-term and sustainable 
development of the company and the conservation for the next generations. 
(Kommission Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen 2010, pp. 3-4.) 
The first chapter deals with the commitment to a responsible handling of the 
ownership. Therefore, the owners should determine which values and 
objectives they feel obliged to. This includes how far the interests of other 
stakeholders are concerned and whether individual interests or company 
interests have priority in case of a conflict. Moreover, the code recommends 
that the company and information structures have to be organized in a way that 
owners and a possible advisory board can evaluate the economic and financial 
situation of the company. The range of this internal transparency has also to be 
determined and to what extent information is communicated to external 
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stakeholders. Eventually, this chapter claims that new family members, like 
spouses or the next generation, are introduced in time to their entrepreneurial 
responsibility as an owner of a family business. (Kommission Governance 
Kodex für Familienunternehmen 2010, pp. 5-6.) 
The recommendations concerning the owner are highlighted in the second 
chapter and are divided into the sub-chapters complete owners and individual 
owners. Firstly, the owners are advised to determine exactly the role of the 
owners and guarantee the disposition of the company as family property. The 
relation of stability, cost-effectiveness and long-term growth should be also 
defined by the owners together with the strategic direction they take. The 
commission also suggests determining whether they want to delegate power to 
a voluntary advisory board or not, in case the board is not obligatory for the 
company. The code advises that it should be determined how many and under 
which circumstances family members are allowed to work in the company and 
to receive merits from the company. In the case that members are working in 
the company, there should be rules for the recruiting and who is making the 
decision about a recruitment of a family member. Further recommendations are 
related to the right to vote and the individual rights and duties of an owner. This 
includes for example the hint to minimize or avoid impacts of divorce and 
heirships for the company. (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2010, pp. 7-10.) 
A family business applying the code should consider the implementation of an 
advisory board, as it can help to ensure the quality and objectivity of the 
advisory and control of a company. The code comprises recommendations 
regarding the tasks, the composition of the board, as well as for the 
remuneration and liability of the board members. The owners should determine 
whether the owner family is represented in the board or if it is only assigned 
with external experts. (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2010, pp. 15-17.) 
The next chapter deals with the tasks, the composition, the remuneration and 
liability of the management. In particular the prerequisites for family members in 
the management board are highlighted extensively. Furthermore, family 
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companies should plan the succession timely and prepare potential successors 
for their function. (Kommission Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen 
2010, pp. 11-14.) 
The issues of result analysis and distribution of profits are explained in the 
following chapter. It is recommended to assign an annual auditor to prove the 
annual statements of accounts even if it is not obligatory for the company. 
Besides, the commission suggests keeping part of the profit within the company 
to strengthen the equity. (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2010, pp. 18-19.) 
The owners should make arrangements to ensure that the shares remain in the 
family. Therefore, the owners should determine exactly who can receive the 
ownership without any restrictions. It has also to be stated, which circumstances 
are necessary to transfer shares to other persons and which legal 
consequences arise. In particular there should be distinct rules for the transfer 
among living persons and after death. Regulations in this field lead to a 
restricted fungibility, but in return for the restricted fungibility the owners should 
have an appropriate right of cancellation. It has to be determined in particular 
under which circumstances, in which time intervals, according to which 
evaluation rules, with which disbursement modalities an owner can resign from 
the common family business. (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2010, p. 20.) 
Moreover, family governance is the second pillar of family business governance 
and the code highlights its great importance. Family governance determines 
who belongs to the owner family, under which circumstances new family 
members become part of the owner family and under which circumstances 
members have to leave the owner family again. Above all, the commission 
recommends communication guidelines to avoid conflicts and common activities 
to strengthen the sense of solidarity. (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2010, pp. 21-22.) 
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4.6.2 Criticism  
Since the code for family businesses was published, there have been 
controversial discussions about whether it was totally refused or endorsed 
completely. The basic criticism of the code is the fact that the classical principal-
agent conflict of information asymmetries between investors and management 
would not exist in family businesses. Therefore, such a code for corporate 
governance does not seem to be necessary. (Grottel et al. 2012, p. 153.)  
However, the GKFU rather tends to make recommendations about a 
responsible management of family businesses than aims to protect powerless 
investors, the main objective of the DCGK (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2010, p. 3). 
Critics give the fact that the polymorphism of family companies would be 
opposed to a uniform code. Furthermore, there might be various possible 
conflicts within a family company, which need a customised solution. This could 
include overlaps between property, family and management, when not all family 
members participate equally in the management, but only act as passive 
partners. This situation can also lead to information asymmetries between 
management and partners. With proceeding generational changes there is the 
threat that the values and objectives of the family might fall into oblivion. This is 
the reason why the code makes recommendations concerning the integration of 
the owner family and to prepare important aspects of the succession in 
advance. (Grottel et al. 2012, pp. 153-154.)   
In addition, the code is being criticised for lacking in practical relevance. The 
given suggestions seem to be self-evident and are generalised. This criticism is 
justified, but nevertheless, the code aims to give incentives to family businesses 
to engage in corporate governance. Besides, the commission of the code wants 
to maintain their decision scope. (Grottel et al. 2012, p. 154.)  To increase the 
acceptance of the GKFU by medium-sized family enterprises it would be 
worthwhile to engage also entrepreneurs of SMEs. At the moment all members 
of the commission, that have an economic background, come from large-scale 
family enterprises. (Neuvians 2013, p. 15.) A quite reasonable point of criticism 
is the fact that the code was designed by INTES. This company advises and 
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guides family companies and wants to realize growth potentials. (Grottel et al. 
2012, p. 154.)  Furthermore, the code was established by a private initiative, but 
this code takes the credit for providing universal recommendations, which are 
essential for all family companies.  
The first version of the code meets with criticism regarding demands from the 
family to give up their control over the company in case they lose the sake and 
ability to lead the company. (Kommission Governance Kodex für 
Familienunternehmen 2004, p. 5; Lange 2009a, p. 144.) This restriction of the 
power of partners is not reasonable in an economic sense. The same is eligible 
for the absolute transparency and disclosure. (Ulrich 2011, p. 107.) In addition, 
the code claims for a binding age limit, as older owners would lack in ability and 
readiness to assume risk. Even if this might be true in individual cases, this 
would definitely restrict the economic and entrepreneurial freedom of family 
businesses and their owners. In addition, a code with all its requirements would 
result in a limitation of the flexibility of family businesses. (Bernhardt 2010, pp. 
7-12.) According to Simon (1990, 1992, 1996, 2007) the entrepreneurial 
flexibility is one of the major benefits of this kind of business (Ulrich 2011, p. 
108). The flexibility stems from the HGB and the “GmbH-Gesetz” (GmbHG). 
Therefore the “Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen” should not be 
seen as a binding guideline for medium-sized family companies, but more as a 
general checklist with suggestions and aspects that can be individually 
considered and implemented by the family and the company. (Ulrich 2011, p. 
108.) 
4.6.3 State of implementation in medium-sized family businesses 
In a recent study, which was published after the amendment of the GKFU, the 
authors highlight the current state of implementation in German family 
businesses (Grottel et al. 2012, pp. 154-157). They used the 2008 list of the 
Top-500 family businesses from the Stiftung Familienunternehmen (Stiftung 
Familienunternehmen 2008, pp. 51-71). However the authors excluded all 
family companies that are listed as stock corporations and have their 
headquarters abroad. Therefore the study examines corporate governance in 
389 large-scale family enterprises. (Grottel et al. 2012, pp. 154-157.) In 
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addition, there is no appropriate study about the state of implementation of 
corporate governance in medium-sized family businesses. In general the 
implementation of new instruments, measures and means normally starts in 
larger companies and then spread further. This mechanism could be seen in the 
development of the DCGK for stock corporations, which was then followed by 
the GKFU for family enterprises. Therefore the author of this study draws 
conclusions from the results and transfers them to medium-sized family 
companies in order to show what the situation is like now.  
Firstly, none of the analysed companies have published information about the 
remuneration or liability of the management, as it was demanded in the GKFU. 
Therefore it can be assumed that medium-sized family companies also do not 
tend to increase transparency regarding this topic. (Grottel et al. 2012, p. 155.) 
Furthermore, only a few of the family enterprises released an annual report and 
most of these companies have a turnover of more than 500 million Euros. This 
can be explained by the fact that the examined family businesses are not capital 
market-orientated and therefore, they do not have disclosure obligations. 
According to Mandler (2004) most of the medium-sized companies are not 
organised as stock corporations and therefore, they are not capital market-
orientated (Ulrich 2011, p. 27). This leads to the assumption that medium-sized 
family businesses rarely release reports about their business operations. 
(Grottel et al. 2012, p. 155.) Family Governance, which concretises the issues 
of the owner family and the boards, was only applied by around two percent of 
the sample group. Therefore, the author of this thesis reasons that in medium-
sized companies this rate is even lower and that family governance does not yet 
play a vital role for them. (Grottel et al. 2012, pp. 155-156.) Moreover, only five 
out of 398 sample companies provide information about their succession 
planning. However, some companies informed the public that several 
generations are already working in the company and therefore the succession 
planning is not so essential for them. (Grottel et al. 2012, p. 156) Further 
findings of the study are that companies provide more information about 
advisory boards and comprehensive governance structures the bigger turnover 
they have. This shows that the smaller the companies are the less likely it is 
that they might have an advisory board or other governance structures and 
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therefore the medium-sized family companies might also be reluctant.  (Grottel 
et al. 2012, p. 156.) 
From the study it can be deduced that family businesses are in general quite 
reluctant to disclose information, as they see them as not relevant for external 
stakeholders and they rather comply with obligations than voluntarily increase 
transparency. However, often the sample companies are concerned about the 
above mentioned topics internally, but they do not communicate their 
achievements. (Grottel et al. 2012, pp. 156-157.) 
4.7 Relevance for medium-sized family businesses 
Medium-sized family companies have different advantages and disadvantages 
regarding corporate governance, which are explained in the following. 
Furthermore, this chapter analyses the relevance of corporate governance for 
medium-sized family businesses. 
The principal-agent theory assumes a personal separation of property and 
management, which is the typical situation in joint-stock companies. This 
organisation is, however, not characteristic for medium-sized family enterprises. 
In family companies with an autocratic entrepreneur or equally participated 
shareholders, ownership and management are identical. Therefore, the 
potential interest conflict is missing and therefore those companies do not have 
agency costs. Due to this fact they have no governance problem. Nevertheless, 
family companies are a quite heterogeneous group with varying legal forms, 
sizes and organisational structures. As soon as ownership and management 
are divided family companies also face governance problems. Furthermore, 
principal-agent conflicts arise when the management is executed by 
professional externals and not by family members. This displays the classical 
conflict of the principal-agent theory. (Welge & Witt 2013, p. 189.) 
Furthermore, medium-sized family companies have lower disclosure 
obligations, which are a common mean to solve principal-agent problems. 
Passive shareholders and outside creditors have less information about the 
economic situation and the pursued strategies than the management. 
Disclosure obligations reduce the information asymmetries. Therefore, they can 
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be seen as an instrument to reduce financing costs and transaction costs of 
capital procurement. However, disclosure obligations can also have severe 
disadvantages for a company. Not only external shareholders and outside 
creditors get insight into the company, but also competitors and clients. Clients 
might press for lower prices in the next negotiation, if the results are good. In 
addition, competitors can analyse more easily the cost structures and new 
products. Medium-sized companies, which have higher disclosure obligations 
than their competitors, are penalised. Thus, low disclosure obligations are a 
competitive advantage. The legislative has determined disclosure obligations 
according to the size classification (§ 267 HGB) and the legal form of a 
company. It can be said that smaller companies have some facilitations (§ 325, 
§ 326, § 327 HGB). Due to these facilitations medium-sized companies have 
governance advantages regarding the disclosure obligations. (Welge & Witt 
2013, pp. 191-192.) 
Besides the advantages of a unity of ownership and control and the lower 
disclosure obligations, medium-sized family businesses also have some 
governance disadvantages, which might make the implementation of corporate 
governance necessary. In many cases medium-sized family businesses are 
facing missing control of the management by the stakeholders. The advisory 
board is the most important element of control by external shareholders and 
other interest groups. It is a good means to receive expertise and to obligate 
specific persons to the company. Furthermore, an advisory board can avoid 
negative impacts of the family on the company. (Neuvians 2013, p.18) In 2012 
more than 60 percent of all German SMEs have implemented an advisory board 
(Achenbach & Gottschalck 2012, p. 50). However, due to scarce legal 
instructions there might be a control deficit in medium-sized companies. (Welge 
& Witt 2013, pp. 193-194.) Only four out of ten family companies equip the 
advisory board with control competencies (May & Lehmann-Tolkmitt 2006, p. 
229). Furthermore, a study executed by Klein (2005) presumes that many 
medium-sized companies only have an advisory board with lacking control 
mechanisms (Welge & Witt 2013, p. 194). Therefore, medium-sized family 
companies have governance disadvantages in the field of control. In addition, it 
has to be said that medium-sized family businesses have fast communication 
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channels and non-bureaucratic procedures, which make them competitive. 
Furthermore, the voluntarily implementation of a board increases the complexity 
of the managerial structure and the costs (Kormann 2008, p. 158). Therefore 
the implementation of an advisory board has to be well deliberated, whereas for 
medium-sized family companies with complex ownership structures it is 
reasonable to implement an advisory board. (Neuvians 2013, pp.17-20.) 
Moreover, family companies in general are more threated to conflicts than joint-
stock companies. Thus, this is equally true for medium-sized family companies. 
These conflicts can arise between the shareholders of large and small number 
of shares, as well as between passive and active partners. Conflicts among 
partners might end up with the exit of shareholders, which can have major 
impacts on the liquidity of the company and the remaining shareholders, when 
they buy shares. Furthermore, conflicts can damage the quality of management 
and the relationship with employees and business partners. In addition, the 
company can suffer from the discharge of economic and technological 
expertise. (Welge & Witt 2013, pp. 194-195.) The worst case scenario is the 
insolvency of the company (Redlefsen & Witt 2006, p. 14). However, it is quite 
obvious that an extensive conflict management for a typical medium-sized 
family company with a limited number of family members is not appropriate. 
Nevertheless, conflicts should not be neglected, but rather regarded as normal 
everyday events. Medium-sized companies should therefore think of 
communication guidelines and an atmosphere of constructive debate that can 
prevent conflicts and they should be prepared for the case that de-escalation is 
not possible anymore. Then a neutral and accepted person should mediate 
between the parties. This form of conflict management is also applicable for 
medium-sized family companies without causing too much cost and effort. 
(Neuvians 2013, pp. 22, 24-24.) 
The dependence on outside financing is a further governance disadvantage of 
medium-sized family companies. The principal-agent theory assumes the 
potential interest conflict between shareholder and management. Therefore this 
model considers basically the governance problem of equity financing. 
Traditional governance instruments, such as an incentive-based remuneration 
or disclosure and liability obligations, intend to protect external shareholders 
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from the opportunistic behaviour of the management. In case a company has 
not or only to a small extent has taken up capital, governance instruments for 
the protection of external shareholders might be expendable. However, not all 
governance instruments are disposable, as a company barely can abstain from 
external financing. In many medium-sized enterprises the companies, the 
financing is internally and externally organised. Therefore, the governance 
instruments aim to protect the outside creditors rather than the external 
shareholders from an opportunistic behaviour of the management. In addition, 
the principal-agent theory is also applicable for outside financing and according 
to Jensen (1986) and Hart (1995) instruments like interest and pay back 
obligations can also be used for this kind of financing (Welge & Witt 2013, p. 
196). In the case of outside financing there are also information asymmetries 
and interest divergences between creditors and management, because the 
parties do not equally participate in the profit and loss accounts of the company. 
Thus, the creditors tend to receive securities. This kind of creditor protection is 
advantageous for the creditor, but for medium-sized companies there are 
severe drawbacks. Medium-sized companies are highly threatened to be 
dependent on banks and to be limited in their strategic possibilities. As Albach 
(1999) stated this is due to the fact that in practice the information asymmetries 
between banks and management are relatively small. Extensive and timely 
reporting duties are standards and medium-sized family businesses have to 
provide detailed investment and business plans, if they aim to receive new 
loans. Furthermore, many advisory boards of medium-sized family businesses 
are assigned by bank representatives (Achenbach & Gottschalck 2012, p. 51), 
who have broad information rights and a voice. It is obvious that medium-sized 
companies are the more dependent on a credit check from the banks, if other 
financing sources are not available or if the market is volatile. Further reasons 
for the dependency on banks are quickly changing technologies and a bad self-
financing power. (Welge & Witt 2013, pp.195-197.)  
Due to the mentioned governance advantages and disadvantages it has to be 
said that corporate governance is certainly an important aspect for the good 
management of a medium-sized family company and should not be ignored. 
Many aspects and recommendations of corporate governance can also be 
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applied by medium-sized family companies and not only by large-scale family 
enterprises. The increase of transparency seems to be unnecessary, but it can 
definitely have an impact on the trust of employees, customers, suppliers and 
among the shareholders as well. Furthermore, medium-sized family companies 
should focus their attention on the family, for example by introducing a family 
day, which increases solidarity significantly and helps to prevent conflicts. 
Eventually, family companies should consider the education of future partners. 
(Neuvians 2013, p. 28.) To sum up, each company has to consider which 
aspects are suitable for their individual situation. This supports the longevity and 
success of a medium-sized family company. 
4.8 Assumptions from the theoretical part for empirical research 
Due to the findings in the theory part certain assumptions can be drawn for the 
empirical part. These assumptions will be compared with the results from the 
interviews.  
The first assumption is a matter of objectives and values. The main objectives 
of medium-sized family businesses regarding corporate governance are the 
long-term success of the company and the fact that the company stays in the 
hands of the owners. This includes the aim to keep the company for several 
generations in the family and to maintain the influence of the family on the 
company. In addition, corporate governance tends to increase commitment and 
solidarity of the family members and reduces the probability of conflicts. 
(Heyden, Blondel & Carlock 2005, p. 2; Koeberle-Schmid et al. 2010, p. 162.) 
Secondly, the theoretical results show that medium-sized family businesses are 
mainly led by the owners in the legal forms of GmbH, sole proprietorship and 
GmbH & Co. KG. Therefore only a few might be led by an external 
management. However, it has to be assumed that the more the ownership and 
management functions are adapted to those of corporations, the more 
corporate governance elements and instruments might be used. (Espel 2008, p. 
28; Janssen 2009, p. 14; Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 200-204.) 
Besides, it can be assumed that the family companies, in which ownership and 
management are unified, have lower control and monitoring needs. This is due 
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to the fact that the principal-agent conflict plays only a minor role in these 
companies. Furthermore, in the majority of medium-sized family businesses the 
control is exerted directly by the owners and partners of the company. (Becker, 
Baltzer & Ulrich 2008, p. 59; Welge & Witt 2013, p. 189.) 
A further assumption is that family businesses are in general quite reluctant to 
disclose information, because they see it as not relevant for external 
stakeholders. (Grottel et al. 2012, pp. 156-157.) 
Moreover, in medium-sized family companies there is often a lack of 
governance instruments, because decisions, as Lange (2005) stated, are 
mainly based on intuition (Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 204). In many cases 
governance instruments are therefore not developed and used sufficiently. New 
legal provisions have an impact on medium-sized family companies and direct 
the companies towards an increased application of these instruments. However, 
family businesses are mainly internally driven to implement governance 
instruments. (Fahrion et al. 2012, pp. 198, 204-205.) 
Due to the family ties, family companies are more threatened by conflicts than 
corporations (Welge & Witt 2013, pp. 194-195). However, an extensive conflict 
management is not very close to reality for a typical medium-sized family 
company (Neuvians 2013, pp. 22, 24-24).  
All in all, medium-sized family businesses have not (yet) developed their 
governance professionally. However, they know the significance of corporate 
governance and already have intuitive approaches for a good development of 
family business governance regarding the transparency, social commitment or 
succession planning. Furthermore, family companies in the hands of the 
following generations are more urged to establish corporate governance than 
owner-run companies of the first generation. (Reinemann & Böschen 2008, pp. 
1-19.) 
63 
 
5. Empirical research 
5.1 Methodology 
5.1.1 Inductive or deductive approach 
For the thesis the inductive approach was chosen to better understand the 
problem of corporate governance in family businesses and to find common 
patterns among the interviewees. The results of the collected data are then 
compared to the findings of the theoretical part. As the topic of “family business 
governance” is not very common yet for medium-sized family businesses, there 
is not much theoretical information about this topic in literature. Therefore the 
inductive approach might help the author to further develop the theoretical 
perspective. (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012, p. 143ff.) 
5.1.2 Qualitative or quantitative approach 
Besides the decision about inductive or deductive approach to the thesis, it had 
to be decided whether to select the qualitative or quantitative approach. For the 
thesis the qualitative approach was more reasonable, as non-numeric data is 
required and it is used to limit predetermined answers. With the qualitative 
approach the data collection is not standardised and as questions may alter and 
emerge during the research process, this approach is more suited to this topic. 
(Saunders et al. 2012, p. 161ff.) 
5.1.3 Standardisation of the interviews 
The author of this research paper chose to conduct semi-structured interviews 
with a framework of predetermined topics and key questions. This helped to 
give the interviews more structure and it was still possible to ask additional 
questions or allow the interviewee to extend an additional point. Semi-structured 
interviews are also more flexible, but with the key questions they are still 
comparable to each other. (Saunders et al. 2012, p. 372ff.) 
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5.2 Data collection and analysis 
All interviews were conducted per telephone or as email interviews. In case of 
telephone interviews, the author used a recording system during the interviews 
and then transcribed them. The written versions of the interviews were sent to 
the participants in order to receive their approval. The email interviews were 
already electronic versions, but they have to be cleaned up from typographical 
errors. All data was scanned for potential categories in order to rearrange the 
data into analytical categories. These were determined by the objective of the 
research. Every new interview added relevant data to the categories. During the 
analysis of the data new key terms and patterns were discovered, and therefore 
the data was rearranged and categories were revised. The aim of the thesis is 
to find valid and well-founded conclusions by excluding other explanations and 
the nature of negative cases. The findings are written down and quantifiable 
results are displayed in graphs and charts as an addition. (Saunders et al. 2012, 
pp. 546-563.) 
5.3 Reliability and validity 
According to Marshall and Rossman (2006) the nature of semi-structured 
interviews might raise concern about the reliability of the data, as they show the 
reality at a certain time when they were collected and the information might 
change if they were conducted again. 
In the interviews the author might also have to cope with biases on both the 
interviewer and interviewee sides, as semi-structured interviews are not fully 
standardised. To overcome biases the author worked towards gaining enough 
knowledge about the theoretical framework and the interviewee to appear 
trustable and credible. (Saunders et al. 2012, pp. 382-383.) 
Furthermore, the issue of generalizability also has to be considered. According 
to Marshall and Rossman (2006) the findings of a qualitative research might be 
harder to generalise, as the data comes from a relatively small and 
unrepresentative number of cases. However, research findings need to be 
related to existing theory in order to demonstrate that the findings have a 
broader theoretical significance. Therefore the results of the thesis might not be 
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applicable for all medium-sized family businesses in Germany, but due to the 
fact that these are based on a broad theory of corporate governance, the 
generalizability can be ensured. (Saunders et al. 2012, pp. 380-384.) 
The validity of semi-structured interviews is given, as the researcher is able to 
clarify questions, to check meanings and to ask further questions in case of 
vague responses. (Saunders et al. 2012, pp. 380-384.) 
5.4 Participants and execution of interviews 
The thesis focuses on corporate governance in medium-sized family 
businesses. Therefore all interviews have been conducted with partners of 
family businesses between ten and 499 employees. To increase applicability, 
reliability and validity of the interviews there are no other similarities than the 
above mentioned. The interviewed companies vary in size, industry and legal 
form. Furthermore, there were only individual interviews and no group 
interviews.  
The empirical data was gathered from seventeen different family companies, 
which are presented briefly below.  
Company A is a wholesaler for organic oils and fats that are used in the 
cosmetics industry, as dietary supplements and for food purposes. The 
company employs fifteen people and has a turnover of 10 million euros. It was 
founded in 2003 and is now led by the son of the founder, but the shares are 
owned by his mother.  
Company B is located in the machine building industry and produces bottling 
plants. This includes the filling, closing and labelling of bottles and bins, as well 
as bottle unscramblers. Around 90 employees generate a turnover of 
approximately 12 million euros. This family company has been in existence 
since 1960 and today the two sons of the founder are in charge.  
Furthermore, Company C is engaged in the textile industry and manufactures 
individual high-quality car and seat covers for all car models and series. A 
turnover of around 1.5 million euros is generated by thirteen employees. The 
66 
 
company has been in existence since 2010 and is run by a married couple. 
However, the shares belong to the husband and the daughters.  
Company D operates in the mining and quarrying industry. It employs around 
100 people and has a turnover of 25 million euros. The company has a quarry 
and provides services in earth-work, civil engineering and road construction, as 
well as ready-mixed concrete and sports and tennis field construction. The 
company was founded in 1924 by two men. Today only one of the families is 
still in the company and the third generation is now in charge. Since 2004 the 
siblings are leading the company.  
Moreover, Company E is a medium-sized family business with 80 employees 
and an annual turnover of seven million euros. Since 1960 the company has 
specialised in sheet metal forming and has been managed by the founder’s 
daughter for ten years.  
A further interview partner was Company F, which is a golf course site. The 
company also offers training courses. The company employs fifteen people and 
generates two million euros. The company is owned by a woman and she runs 
the company together with her son.  
Company G has been in existence since 1897 and trades with oils and fats for 
the cosmetics industry, pharmacy, chemistry and technical industry. The 
company is owned and led by two brothers. Furthermore, the company is a 
supplier for the food industry.  Around 150 people are employed and the 
company group generates around 50 million euros. The company has nine 
subsidiaries and representations. In addition, the company has entered a 
strategic partnership with an oil mill and plantation for almonds and walnuts in 
California. Therefore the company is not only a wholesaler for oils and fats, but 
also a producer of almond and walnut oil.  
Besides, the Company H provides empirical data. It produces malt and brews 
malt beer. The company was founded in the 19th century and has now 140 
employees, which generate around a 44-million euros turnover. The company is 
led by the fourth and fifth generations of the family, who are a married couple 
and their nephew.  
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Company I is a well-known bookseller, which was already founded in the year 
1596. However, the owner family have changed several times in the past. 
Today the company is owned and led by two brothers and one of the sons. In 
addition, the wives of the three men are also part of the management. The 
company employs 450 people and generates a 50-million euros turnover.  
The next interview partner, the Company J, is an oil mill and a wholesaler for 
edible oils, which has been in existence since 1859. The company’s own brand 
is sold in Germany and parts of Europe, but the company also manufactures 
private brands. The family business employs around 50 people and generates 
27 million euros. The company is owned by the father and his two daughters. 
However, the two women are in charge.  
Company K produces sensors, measurement instrumentation and control 
systems for various industries. The company was founded in 1969 and is now 
led by the owner-manager. Around 50 employees work for this company and 
the turnover accounts for approximately seven million euros.  
A sales company for professional coffee machines is the interview partner 
Company L. The company is led by two brothers, who assume the responsibility 
from their father. He founded the company in 1960. Today around 15 
employees work in the company and the company makes a turnover of almost 
three million euros.  
Company M is selling pallet transporters, haulers and industrial trailers. In 
addition, they offer machines for rent, various services, including advice, 
procurement of spare parts and repair and driver trainings. The company 
employs 60 people and generates a turnover of almost ten million euros. 
Furthermore, the company is led by one man, who is supported by his parents 
and his wife.  
In addition, Company N sells and installs garage doors and drive systems. 
Furthermore, it offers repair services. Eleven employees work for this company 
and the company makes a turnover of one million euros. The company is led by 
a couple, but the company is owned by the husband.  
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A further interview partner was Company O that develops application systems 
for liquids and powder. Around 140 employees work for this owner-run family 
company and the turnover accounts for sixteen million euros. The company has 
been in existence since 60 years and two families hold shares.  
The next interview partner was Company P. It is a wholesaler for bookbinding 
demands and print finishing. It employs 24 people and generates a turnover of 
around four million euros. The company is owned and run by a married couple 
and another man. They bought the company from someone else. However, the 
company has been in existence since 1869.  
The last company, that was interviewed, was the Company Q. They offer 
services in urban, landscape, site development and free space planning, as well 
as real estate evaluation services. Twenty people work for this architectural 
office and the sales amount to approximately one million euros. The business is 
owned and led by one man, but his wife and his son also work in it.  
5.5 Analysis and summary of findings 
In this chapter the interviews of the sample companies are analysed and 
examined to find out to which extent they use corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the author evaluates the significance of corporate governance in 
these companies and which elements or instruments the interviewed family 
companies use. In addition, the results of the interviews are compared to the 
assumptions drawn in chapter 4.8 from the theoretical findings. Therefore this 
chapter is divided into general information, findings of business governance and 
family governance. Finally, the results are summarised. 
General information 
In this part general information about the companies are displayed. In addition, 
the interview partners are asked whether they know the GKFU and what 
benefits they see. 
The sample group consists of seventeen companies, which range from eleven 
to 499 employees and an annual turnover between one million and fifty million 
Euros. In Graph 1 the distribution of the turnover range can be seen. 53 percent 
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of all companies have a turnover of less than nine million euros. In addition, 29 
percent generate a turnover between ten and thirty million euros, while 18 
percent of the sample group earn more than 30 million euros.  
 
Graph 1. Turnover  
Furthermore, the companies can be also classified according to their number of 
employees. The author defined the object of investigation as medium-sized 
family businesses with eleven to 499 employees. As it can be seen in Graph 2 
41 percent of the sample companies employ between eleven and 49 people. 
Besides, 29 percent of the interviewed companies have up to 99 employees 
and 18 percent employ up to 149 employees. Between 150 and 499 employees 
are working in 12 percent of the companies. 
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Graph 2. Number of employees  
The choice of the legal form also influences corporate governance. In chapter 
4.3.1 it was figured out that medium-sized family businesses are mainly led in 
the legal forms of GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG and as sole proprietorships. 
Therefore, Graph 3 highlights this aspect. Eleven out of seventeen sample 
companies are registered as a GmbH, which equals to 65 percent. Besides, 
seventeen percent of the companies have the legal form of a GmbH & Co. KG 
and twelve percent are a sole proprietorship. One company out of seventeen is 
a KG. However, the GmbH & Co. KG is a special type of the KG.   
 
Graph 3. Legal form  
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In addition, the sample companies can be classified according to industry 
sectors, which are determined by the statistical classification system of 
economic activities in the European Community. Graph 4 shows that more than 
three-quarters (76 percent) of the companies are located in the manufacturing 
or wholesale and retail trade sector. One company is located in each of the 
remaining industry sectors. These are the mining and quarrying industry, the 
arts, entertainment and recreations industry, as well as construction and 
professional service industry. 
 
Graph 4. Industry sectors 
As it was explained in chapter 2.3 family companies can also be classified 
according to the typology of Becker, Staffel & Ulrich (2008a). Therefore, six 
companies of the sample group can be classified as type A (Graph 5). These 
are family companies that are owned and managed by an individual. All of these 
companies range among the smallest sample companies regarding turnover. In 
addition, Type B is the correspondent type for the remaining eleven companies 
(Graph 5). These are companies, which are either owned by an individual and 
managed by the family or owned by the family and managed by an individual. 
Type B includes all company sizes regarding turnover, as this class is wider. 
The third case is that management and ownership are in the hands of a family. 
None of the companies can be allocated to Type C, as none of the interviewed 
enterprises are externally managed (Graph 5). As it was stated in chapter 3.1.1 
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this means that Type A companies are less likely to need governance 
mechanisms as ownership and management are unified in one person. In this 
case information asymmetries are avoided and no agency costs occur. This is 
equally true for companies, in which all owners held the same number of shares 
and are all equally participating in the management of the company. From the 
eleven Type B companies, only two family companies have equal shares and 
management competencies, while in all others the principal-agent conflict can 
emerge. Therefore, those two family businesses and all Type A companies 
have the most efficient governance structure without any agency costs. 
According to the principal-agent theory this means that the remaining ten family 
companies can be highly influenced by principal-agent conflicts and therefore 
need corporate governance mechanisms.   
 
Graph 5. Company types of the sample group  
After highlighting some general information, which was gathered from the 
interview companies, the author aims to analyse whether the sample 
companies know the concept of family business governance and the GKFU. 
Furthermore, the implementation of a code is also examined. Seven of the 
interview partners stated that they do not know family business governance and 
the GKFU. However, ten out of seventeen companies already have some 
knowledge of corporate governance in family companies. Moreover, it became 
apparent that all of the interviewed companies with a turnover of more than 
thirty million euros know the concept, while only 60% of the companies with a 
turnover between ten and thirty million euros are familiar with it. In addition, 
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44% of the smallest companies in the sample group know family business 
governance and the GKFU. This shows that the bigger a family company is the 
more likely the people behind it have dealt with corporate governance. The 
author also wanted to know from the interview partners if they have 
implemented the GKFU or any other code with good governance principles, but 
none of the interviewed companies have actively taken measures to implement 
a corporate governance code in their organisational structures. Nevertheless, 
six companies explained that they have implemented parts of the GKFU or 
other governance principles in their company; in particular they mentioned the 
memorandum of association, which often clarifies certain governance principles 
in these companies. Again these are the bigger companies of the sample group. 
Except for one company these six companies all have more than a ten-million 
euro turnover. All three companies with more than a thirty-million euro turnover 
and two companies with ten to thirty million euros are included in this group. 
This confirms the findings above that larger companies are more likely to deal 
with corporate governance. In addition, four companies manifest interest in the 
GKFU and corporate governance in medium-sized family companies. One of 
these companies mentioned as a reason conflicts between the two brothers 
who own and manage the company. The interview partner is of the mind that if 
the owners had dealt with corporate governance mechanisms the conflict 
potential could have been decreased. Besides, the eleven companies, which 
said that they do not have any fragments of corporate governance established, 
have different reasons how they justify their refusal. Even if they assume that 
they do not have governance structures in their organisation, there might be 
fragments, which are unconsciously part of corporate governance. These 
elements are highlighted below. Three companies stated that they are too small 
to implement corporate governance mechanisms and two other companies 
name the simple family structure as a reason for not having specific corporate 
governance. In addition, one interview partner said that they were aware of an 
external buy-out when they founded the company. The reason for this is that the 
children of the owner couple were not willing to take over the responsibility. 
Furthermore, two companies said that they see no necessity for corporate 
governance in their company. For one of these two companies corporate 
governance and the GKFU are just regulating matters of course, while the other 
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interview partner perceives corporate governance as an additional burden, 
which creates extra work without any benefit. Another interview partner is not 
reluctant to corporate governance in general, but he thinks that this is a topic, 
which should be determined and arranged individually by every owner. 
Therefore, he rejects the GKFU as a generally applicable code for all kinds of 
family businesses. The last two companies each have no time for corporate 
governance due to the day-to-day business or the implementation is blocked by 
one side of the owners, as they do not want to concern themselves with this 
topic. However, most of the companies assumed that they would change their 
attitude towards the implementation of corporate governance if the company 
would grow significantly or the ownership structure would become more 
complex. Generally speaking, the interviewed companies perceive corporate 
governance more as an issue for larger companies.  
Moreover, the author wanted to know if the interviewees think that the 
governance code for family businesses seems to be useful for medium-sized 
companies and what benefit they might see. This might help to answer the 
research question whether the GKFU is suitable for medium-sized family 
businesses and why the owners should implement corporate governance in 
their businesses. Even if some of the interview partners do not know the GKFU, 
they mostly have an opinion about it, after the author had explained shortly the 
concept. Three of the sample companies are an exception. They do not see any 
benefit from the GKFU and the underlying concept, as they do not know the 
code. This equals to around 18 percent of the sample group. In addition, almost 
a third of the companies (29 percent) think that the code has no benefit for 
medium-sized companies, as they are. However, these interview partners 
definitely see advantages for larger family businesses. This corresponds with 
the view of two companies, which argue that the GKFU is suitable and 
meaningful for large family groups with complex ownership structures, which 
often have diverging interests due to the heterogeneous group of shareholders. 
They often name companies like Henkel or Dr. Oetker as examples for 
companies that need a code. Furthermore, the GKFU seems to be quite hard to 
implement in medium-sized family companies. Two of the seventeen companies 
(12 percent) name the efforts as a main reason why they would not establish a 
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code in their company. They see the documentation requirements and the 
personnel-intensive document development and management as the main 
obstacles, which are not compensated by the benefits of corporate governance. 
Moreover, some of the guidelines of the GKFU are perceived as being quite 
implicit. Therefore the implementation of the code is not really beneficial for two 
companies. In particular, the succession and resignation guidelines or 
recommendations concerning transparency are not seen as necessary, 
because these topics are determined anyway in the memorandum of 
association or are claimed by financial institutions or public offices. In addition, 
having such a code is perceived by one company more as empty phrases than 
real benefits. The interviewee stated that reasonable family entrepreneurs 
always have led their company in a way that a balance of power is given, even 
without corporate governance. Besides, three companies (18 percent) think that 
the implementation of the GKFU is more an image gain for the company, than a 
support measure for the long-term success of the company. Ultimately, four 
interview partners (24 percent) endorse the benefit and meaningfulness of the 
GKFU. One interview partner stated that the code can provide incentives how to 
define the position of the family, single family members and the company. The 
company and the family members, who are immediately dependent on the 
company rank first and then the other family members have to subordinate. If all 
family members are aware of their positions and the expectations they face and 
that they can have, many conflicts could be avoided among the family. This 
would prevent many family companies being ruined by internal disputes or 
because family members wanting to get rich on the expense of other family 
members and the company. Furthermore, they see the code for family 
companies as an excellent tool for owners, who face the responsibility of a long-
term and healthy cooperation of business and family. In total, the code is 
meaningful for medium-sized companies for a majority of the interview partners 
and eleven out of seventeen interviewed persons speak out positively on the 
code. This equals to around 65 percent. As eighteen percent of the interviewed 
companies have not made any specifications about the code, only seventeen 
percent of the sample group think that the GKFU does not have positive 
impacts on family companies. Graph 6 summarises shortly how the sample 
companies perceive the advantages of the code.  
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Graph 6. Perceived benefits of the GKFU according to the sample companies  
Business governance 
In this chapter the author analyses all aspects of the interviews regarding the 
business governance. This includes the management and ownership structure, 
instruments of corporate governance and the establishment of supervisory 
boards. In addition, the degree of transparency is analysed. 
First of all, the management and ownership structure of the companies are 
examined. In 47 percent of all cases ownership and management are unified in 
the same persons. This can be either a single managing partner or several 
owners who are managing their company together. In this case the principal-
agent conflict is minimised and corporate governance mechanisms are less 
needed. In five sample companies there are additional owners, who are not 
represented in the management. Furthermore, one company has a different 
owner than manager. The company is owned by the mother, while her son is in 
charge. In contrast, two companies have additional managers in the executive 
board. In one case the owner’s wife support the management. In the other 
company, the husband of one of the partners is also in charge. Nevertheless, 
these are members of the family and therefore no external management. As it 
was stated in a sup-chapter of 4.3.1 about the executive management, medium-
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sized family businesses are mainly led by the owners. This can be verified by 
the sample group, as none of the companies have installed an external 
management. Moreover, in all sample companies, in which differences between 
management and ownership are existent, there can be governance problems. 
Therefore, these companies should have corporate governance mechanisms, 
which avoid or prevent typical problems of the principal-agent conflict. 
Besides, the situation of the sample companies regarding the implementation 
and existence of supervisory boards is analysed. As highlighted in chapter 4.3.1 
obligatory boards are mainly irrelevant for medium-sized family companies, due 
to size limitations. However, the theoretical findings show that the control is 
mainly exerted directly by the owners of the company and not by boards 
(Becker, Baltzer & Ulrich 2008, p. 59). This is strongly proven by the empirical 
findings. None of the seventeen interviewed companies has either an obligatory 
or a voluntarily implemented supervisory board. In 53 percent of all cases the 
interview partners reasoned it with the fact that the managers bear the 
responsibility. In addition, these managers are also all owners of their family 
companies. Therefore they have a good position regarding information supply 
and control needs. Moreover, two interview partners explicitly say that they are 
only accountable to themselves. Nevertheless, the interview partner highlighted 
that they are supported by external consultants, such as auditors, lawyers and 
tax accountants. Furthermore, three companies explained that they have 
regular meetings with all shareholders and additional consultants if necessary. 
In these companies the succession already took place and the next generation 
is in charge. However, in all three cases a certain amount of shares is still 
possessed by the first generation. Therefore, these regular meetings are 
necessary to provide information and to agree about investments or the future 
position of the company. In addition, in these meetings the participants analyse 
the current situation of the company. As explained in chapter 4.3.2 these 
meetings correspond with the shareholders’ general meeting. This means that 
the persons, who participate in this meeting, are the highest decision-making 
unit in their company. They have an extensive authority to give directions 
towards the management. In all other sample companies there is no separation 
between ownership and management, therefore there is no need for 
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shareholder meetings. Two of the above mentioned companies and another 
one also stated that they would be willing to establish a supervisory board in 
future in case the conditions would change significantly. This means that if the 
ownership structure becomes more complex with more partners. Another 
reason would be an external management. Then a board would be filled with 
family members to control and monitor the management. In addition, these 
companies mentioned that they would be also prepared to implement a board, 
which acts as an adviser, in case there are severe conflicts among the 
managing partners. However, all three interview partner highlighted that an 
external supervisory board would rather advise than control the management. 
The board should advise in essential and important decision-making.  
The central instruments of business governance are internal audit, internal 
control system, risk management and compliance management. In chapter 
4.4.1 the instruments are explained in detail and the reasons why they are 
necessary are elucidated. Due to the theoretical findings it can be assumed that 
there is a lack of governance instruments in medium-sized family companies. 
This results from the fact that the principal-agent conflict, which is the basis of 
governance instruments, is only rudimentary. Furthermore, the more the family 
business is adapted to corporations the more necessary these instruments 
become. In contrast, smaller companies also have lower control and monitoring 
needs. Therefore, Lange (2005) figured out that business governance 
instruments, such as risk management, compliance management, internal audit 
and internal control system, are not developed and used sufficiently, but 
decisions are mainly based on intuition (Fahrion et al. 2012, p. 204). This 
finding can be verified by the fact that five interviewees stated that they use 
these instruments more implicitly than explicitly. In addition, one of the 
interviewed people said that an entrepreneur should know the risks exactly 
without having extensive instruments. However, twelve out of seventeen (71 
percent) sample companies have at least one of the instruments. Moreover, six 
companies (35 percent) use some kind of risk management. This is not always 
professionally developed, but at least these companies are aware of the most 
important risks and how to cope with them. In addition, four respectively seven 
companies use compliance management measures and use the internal audit 
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to improve the business processes. An internal control system is used by 59 
percent of the sample group. The main procedures and measures, which are 
used by the companies, are agreements, approvals, authorisations, guidelines, 
credit limits, accounting control and the four-eyes principle. Graph 7 highlights 
briefly the usage of business governance instruments in the sample group. 
 
Graph 7. Use of business governance instruments  
Another important parameter to measure the significance of corporate 
governance in medium-sized family companies is the degree of transparency. 
Nowadays it is quite important to organise processes in a transparent way. In 
addition, with increased transparency the companies have better financing 
options due to limited access to the capital market (Frasl & Rieger 2007, pp. 20-
29). However, family companies are rumoured to be reluctant to display more 
information than necessary. This view can be confirmed by the empirical 
findings. Thirteen companies out of seventeen (76 percent) reject strong 
disclosure obligations and prefer to be only as transparent as they have to be. 
For these companies it is important to be as reticent as possible. They even see 
the disclosure obligations from public authorities and the Federal Statistical 
Office as critical. In addition, they often do not use external financing. Therefore, 
transparency towards financial institutions is not that important for them and 
they even consider it as critical. In comparison, only 24 percent think that 
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transparency is necessary and important. One of the interview partners 
describes transparency as a win-win situation. The company achieves better 
conditions and receives understanding in case the economic situation of the 
company is not that good. Furthermore, they see transparency as an essential 
tool to build trust and authenticity by an open communication. This willingness 
to be transparent also includes quality requirements and in particular openness 
and honesty towards the customers and employees. Noticeable is that these 
companies belong to the group of larger companies. All three companies with 
more than a 30-million euros turnover and one of the companies with a turnover 
between ten and thirty million Euros stated that transparency is important. Again 
this shows that the more a family company adapts to corporations the more 
corporate governance mechanisms are implemented.  
Family governance 
The chapter family governance highlights the findings about succession, family 
activities, solidarity, conflict management, as well as the social commitment of 
the companies.  
Companies with good corporate governance have determined who is allowed to 
become a partner and owner of the company. In the sample group only three 
out of seventeen companies have not yet determined who can receive shares of 
the family company. Furthermore, in 53 percent of the companies it is stipulated 
that only the children of the current owners can become partners. The spouses 
are explicitly excluded. This can help to prevent the fragmentation of the 
company, as the shares remain in the hands of fewer people. In three 
companies either the children or a spouse is allowed to join the company. In 
addition, one company determined that only a spouse can join. In this case 
there are no children in the family who could take over the responsibility. The 
last company has not made any restrictions regarding the entry into the family 
company. This means that externals also can be engaged in the business. 
Graph 8 highlights that 82 percent of the sample group have thought about that 
question. In 93 percent of the companies, which have arrangements, the access 
to the company is limited to family members. However, the author is not able to 
81 
 
identify any interdependencies between the size of the company, the legal form 
and the regulations in the question who is allowed to join the family company. 
 
Graph 8. Who can become a partner in the family business?  
A further topic of interest was the procedure when a partner would die or want 
to leave the company. The author was interested in whether the interviewees 
determined what happened with the shares. Fifteen of the interviewed 
companies (88 percent) stated that they forward the shares in case of the death 
of a partner via the classical descent according to the before mentioned 
regulations. Nevertheless, some of the companies have special regulations 
regarding the heritage. One company pass the shares to the children in equal 
shares, when either both children are working in the company or none of them 
is in charge. However, if only one of the children bears the responsibility of the 
family company, the shares would be passed completely to this heir. The 
remaining heir is paid with private assets. This regulation intends to prevent 
conflicts due to different objectives regarding the company. In addition, the 
interview partner states that it would not be fair if one bears the total risk and 
responsibility, while the sibling only receives the profits. Furthermore, the one in 
the management would have taken into account the opinion and decisions of 
the other heir. Finally, this regulation also reduces the fragmentation and keeps 
the company together. Two interview partners highlighted that in case the 
partners have no children, but a spouse, he or she would be indemnified. 
However, the shares would be returned to the remaining owners. Again this 
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reduces fragmentation and the threat of alienation. A further approach was that 
the company shares can explicitly only be passed on to one successor. 
However, the interview partner has not specified what happened if there are 
several heirs. In one company the succession has to take place with a mutual 
agreement between the two owner families. In the case of the resignation of a 
partner, the sample companies named different options. In ten out of seventeen 
companies the shares have to be offered first to the other partners, before they 
are offered on the market. This right of pre-emption assures that the company is 
still possessed by the family. One interview partner explained that in case of a 
resignation of an owner, the “Stuttgarter Verfahren” is used to evaluate the 
shareholder value. This is a fiscal procedure to evaluate unquoted shares of a 
corporation. As it is an excess profit compensation procedure, the shareholder 
value is calculated as the value of total assets plus an additional charge for 
above-average profits. However, in companies with only one partner a sale to 
externals is the most probable solution. This option was named by five of the 
sample companies. These companies have either no children or they have 
nothing decided yet, as the children are still quite young. In addition, two 
interview partners stated that shares can be taken over by all family members, 
but not by externals. These companies want to assure the influence of the 
company on the family and are not that afraid of a fragmentation. 
Moreover, the author explored the succession planning of the interviewed 
companies. The succession is already fixed in five companies (29 percent) of 
the sample group, but in the remaining twelve companies (71 percent) there are 
no arrangements made. However, it has to be said that in nine of these twelve 
companies the succession has already taken place in the last few years. 
Therefore, the next generation is not yet prepared to assume responsibility. As 
mentioned before five companies already have detailed plans for the 
succession. Two companies tend to a disposition of the company, as there are 
in one case no children and in the other case the children do not want to 
continue the company. One company draws on both external managers and the 
own children to tie them to the company. In this way they have all options, but 
this can also lead to conflicts due to disappointed expectations. In another 
company the family is discussing at the moment how they should organise the 
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succession. Finally, one company has a detailed testament, which specifies the 
succession. 
Besides the succession, the author also examined the conflict management of 
the participating companies, as conflicts are much more probable to occur in 
family businesses than in public organisations. This results from the overlapping 
of family and company, as explained in chapters 2.3 and 4.4.2. Graph 9 shows 
that five companies do not have specific procedures if conflicts among the 
management and owners come up. In three of the companies there is only an 
owner-manager. Obviously a conflict management is not necessary. One 
interview partner stated that there have not been any conflicts among the 
married couple who is leading the company. In addition, the two daughters 
leave the company as limited partners at the end of 2014. Then only one person 
owns and manages the company, which makes a conflict management 
needless. Furthermore, one company handles conflicts by determining one 
person who is responsible and who makes the decisions. The majority of 
companies solve their conflicts with discussions and dialogues. These seven 
companies do not want to be supported by external mediators and rather solve 
it internally. Moreover, four companies have determined that in case of severe 
conflicts they consult an external mediator. Often this mediator is a consultant 
or the auditor of the company. Even if only four companies are prepared to 
consult an external, it has to be acknowledged that more than 70 percent of the 
sample companies have determined specific procedures on how to solve their 
conflicts on a rational basis. However, two companies mentioned that they have 
conflicts, which can hardly be solved, even with external support. One of the 
interview partners even stated that their conflicts can barely be solved, as the 
two owner-managers do not speak to each other. He is of the mind that this 
conflict leads to an asset stripping of the company in the medium-term. In 
addition, other interviewees also highlighted that they know some examples of 
family companies in their environment, which are destroyed due to internal 
conflicts. These findings show how important the solidarity among the family 
members and with the company is for the longevity of a family company. 
Besides, conflicts bind important resources of the owners and managers, which 
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can result in a poorer performance of the company. Furthermore, conflicts might 
decrease the reputation of the company. 
 
Graph 9. Conflict management 
The most important instruments of the family governance are family activities 
and family education. However, it has to be said that only one of the companies 
has a decent educational system for the owners, successors and other family 
members. The reason could be the fact that medium-sized family businesses 
might still be too small for such professional and extensive systems. There are 
probably not enough participants for trainings and other events. However, one 
company organises regular trainings. Furthermore, the author analysed the 
family activities of the sample group. It became evident that only four out of 
seventeen companies have basic approaches to the instrument of family 
activities. Most of the families have common activities, but not necessarily 
related to the company. These activities include common excursions, short 
journeys or eating out. However, with these common activities they aim to 
strengthen the solidarity and the relationship among the family members. This is 
also supported by the fact that eleven interview partners highlighted the 
importance of solidarity and trust within the family, as this helps to manage the 
family business. 
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Besides family activities, the social commitment or family philanthropy is also an 
important aspect of family governance. As stated in chapter 4.4.2 the theoretical 
findings suggest that the entrepreneurial families want to give a part of their 
success back to society. In most cases they do not expect an economic benefit 
from their social commitment. Furthermore, the theory shows that family 
companies mainly get involved in projects or associations in the region they 
come from. In the sample group 76 percent are socially committed, while 24 
percent are not involved. However, one of these companies highlighted that 
they try to shift their social commitment to the private side, as then both owner 
families can support the organisations and projects they like. In chapter 4.4.2 it 
was highlighted that 44 percent of the entrepreneurial families are committed to 
social concerns. However, this figure is highly outperformed with 76 percent. 
The commitment of the sample group ranges from education, arts, culture and 
sports to beneficiary and Christian projects and organisations. In contrast to the 
theoretical findings that companies are mainly committed to educational issues 
and then to arts, culture and sports, the interviewed companies are more 
beneficent. Twelve out of thirteen companies (92 percent), which gave insights 
into their social commitment, are beneficent. Furthermore, three companies also 
emphasises that their company is based on Christian values and therefore they 
are supporting Christian projects and organisations. Nevertheless, the 
interviewed companies are also committed to education (23 percent), arts (31 
percent), culture (31 percent) and sports (46 percent). In addition, many of the 
interview partners stated that they are focusing on projects and organisations, in 
which they, family members or employees are involved. They often have a 
personal relationship to the issues that they are fostering. All in all, social 
commitment seems to be an important aspect for these medium-sized family 
companies. 
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Graph 10. Social commitment 
Summary of findings 
In this chapter the findings above from the general part, the business 
governance and family governance aspects are summarised. Furthermore, the 
author compares them with the assumptions drawn in chapter 4.8. This should 
show whether or not the theoretical findings can be verified by the empirical 
results.  
In addition, the individual interview partners of the sample group are evaluated 
regarding the significance of family business governance in their companies. 
This answers how important family business governance is for German 
medium-sized family businesses, which is the main research question. 
Therefore, the relevant aspects, elements and instruments of family business 
governance are listed and compared with the answers from the interview 
partners. For each company the achieved percentage is calculated. The author 
determined that with a value of 60 percent, family business governance has a 
high significance in the sample company. Table 6 shows the relevant 
parameters for the calculation. 
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General parameters Business governance Family governance 
typology supervisory boards family representation 
implementation of 
fragments 
risk management who can become an owner 
 compliance management succession 
 internal audit regulations at death 
 internal control system regulations for resignation 
 transparency family activities 
  family education 
  family philanthropy 
  conflict management 
Table 6. Parameters 
Based on these parameters it can be determined that in five companies family 
business governance has a high significance. These companies are Company 
G (82 percent), Company H (65 percent), Company I (76 percent), Company J 
(82 percent) and Company M (63 percent). The values in brackets show how 
many parameters are fulfilled by the company. The other companies all have 
values below sixty percent and therefore the significance is low. Their 
percentage rates range between 25 and 53 percent. Noticeable is the fact that 
three out of the five companies again belong to the group of the large sample 
companies with a turnover of over thirty million euros and more than hundred 
employees. In addition, the two other also range among the larger sample 
companies regarding employee numbers, but Company M is a rather small 
company concerning the turnover. Furthermore, this company is a Type A 
company with an owner-manager. This fact makes it even more remarkable that 
they hold family business governance dear. Moreover, except for Company M, 
the mentioned companies all have variances in the ownership and management 
structure. Therefore, corporate governance mechanisms help to prevent and 
solve principal-agent conflicts, which might occur. These findings confirm the 
findings above. For these companies it could be also interesting to compare 
their regulations with the principles of the GKFU in order to develop their 
governance in an even more professional way. At the moment many regulations 
are based on intuition. The GKFU could give valuable instructions and hints to 
them. Moreover, the parameters, which are most represented in the sample 
group are the regulations at death with sixteen nominations, followed by the 
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ownership definition and regulations regarding the succession and resignation 
with each fourteen nominations and the internal control system with ten 
nominations. Furthermore, family philanthropy and conflict management also 
have a high weight in the sample group with thirteen respectively twelve 
nominations. This list shows what is important for medium-sized family 
companies. All companies have made certain regulations in case of death of the 
owner. This regulation assures the longevity and survivability of the family 
business, as well as it guarantees stable circumstances, which communicate 
reliability and continuity for business partners. 
In the following the assumptions from chapter 4.8 are compared with the 
findings above. This highlights in how far the theory corresponds with the reality 
and summarises the most important empirical findings. 
The first assumption highlights the desire of family companies to be successful 
in the long-term and to maintain the influence of the family in the company. This 
issue was not analysed above in detail, but thirteen companies stated that they 
aim to remain a family business and twelve interview partners pointed out that 
the long-term success and longevity of their family company is an important 
objective for them. Therefore, with over 70 percent of the companies the first 
assumption can be verified. In addition, this is supported by the fact that eight 
companies stated that an economic independence is very important for them. 
They want to avoid that externals, in particular financial institutions, gain 
influence on company decisions. Another aspect of the first assumption was the 
solidarity among the family members and with the family business. For almost 
60 percent this is an important aspect, as without strong solidarity and trust a 
family business can hardly be managed. When the solidarity and harmony are 
missing, conflicts might appear more easily. This is the case in one of the 
sample companies, in which the two owner-managers do not even talk to each 
other. The interview partners stated that this probably results in the asset 
stripping of the company.  
Furthermore, the author assumed that medium-sized family businesses are 
mainly led by the owners themselves. The empirical results show that this 
assumption is also correct. None of the companies has an external 
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management. However, the managers are not always identical with the owners. 
As shown above, in eight companies there are variances between ownership 
and management. In these companies the principal-agent conflict can appear 
and therefore corporate governance is needed. It is also totally correct that 
medium-sized family companies are mainly organized in the legal forms of 
GmbH, GmbH & Co. KG and as sole proprietorships. Graph 3 shows that 65 
percent of the sample companies are a GmbH and 17 percent are a GmbH & 
Co. KG. Besides, one company is a KG and two companies are sole 
proprietorships. Above all, it is true that the more the ownership and 
management structures are adapted to corporations, the more corporate 
governance elements and instruments are used. As shown above, mainly for 
the larger participants of the study, corporate governance has a high 
significance. This is due to the fact that they have more often implemented 
governance instruments, have decent conflict solving strategies and have clear 
guidelines and regulations for succession and ownership.  
In addition, it became apparent that in companies with unified ownership and 
management, the need for control and monitoring is less given, as assumed in 
chapter 4.8. An individual owner-manager is hardly faced with principal-agent 
conflicts and has no need for extensive guidelines. A further fact is that the 
companies are directly controlled by the owners and not by supervisory boards. 
As shown above none of the companies have an obligatory or voluntarily 
implemented supervisory board. In many cases the ownership and 
management structure is not very complex and there are many overlaps 
between the two functions.  
Even if transparency is an important aspect of corporate governance, it could be 
verified by the empirical findings that medium-sized family businesses are quite 
reluctant to disclose information. The majority of companies (76 percent) reject 
strong disclosure obligations. Again it turns out that the larger the company the 
more the interview partners are in favour of transparency. The reason for this 
general reticence might be the fact that external financing is not that important 
for medium-sized family companies. Furthermore, the families behind these 
companies often want to protect their privacy.  
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A further assumption concerns the governance instruments both for family 
governance and business governance. The theoretical findings show that in 
medium-sized family companies there is often a lack of these instruments. This 
could be explained by the fact that decisions in medium-sized family companies 
are mainly based on intuition. Actually, at least one interview partner stated that 
they base their decisions on intuition and having a good feeling about it. 
Nevertheless, the study shows that 71 percent of the sample companies have 
at least one of the business governance instruments: risk management, 
compliance management, internal audit or internal control system. Furthermore, 
twelve out of seventeen companies have strategies on how to solve conflicts 
among the owners and managers of their business. In contrast, the family 
governance instruments family activities and family education are barely used. 
Only one company executes family education measures and four companies 
have common activities in the family to strengthen the solidarity. Despite this 
quite extensive distribution of business governance instruments and the rather 
weak development of family business governance instruments, it has to be said 
that in some cases the instruments are rather simple and not professionally 
developed, though it cannot be expected that the instruments are as 
professionally developed as in large family companies. This would extend the 
resources of a medium-sized family business.  
The last assumption deals with the family relationships and conflict 
management. In the empirical research it became obvious that conflicts in 
family businesses are ubiquitous, but not always threaten the existence of the 
company. Conflict management can help to prevent and solve severe conflicts 
and a majority of the sample companies has developed a strategy on how to 
proceed in case of conflict. This ranges from open discussions, one single 
decision-maker to external mediators, who arbitrate between the parties. As 
assumed, the companies in the sample group prefer simple solutions for 
conflicts rather than an extensive conflict management. Therefore, this 
assumption can also be confirmed. 
All in all, it has to be confirmed that corporate governance in medium-sized 
family businesses is not (yet) developed professionally. However, as assumed, 
they know the significance of family business governance and have intuitive 
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approaches to maintain the long-term success of their business. Furthermore, it 
has to be stated that there are quite huge differences between the interviewed 
companies. As shown above, the larger companies with a higher turnover and 
more employees have in total a higher awareness and state of implementation 
than the smaller sample companies. This finding arises from the fact that in 
those smaller companies the need for corporate governance mechanisms is 
often minimised due to the unity of ownership and management.   
6. Conclusion and recommendations 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the importance of corporate 
governance in German medium-sized family businesses and to gain a deep 
understanding of the elements and instruments of family business governance. 
In addition, a goal was to analyse the level of implementation of family business 
governance in medium-sized family businesses.  
In the theory part family businesses, corporate governance in general and 
family business governance with its elements and instruments were explained. 
Based on the theoretical framework of the principal-agent theory, the 
stewardship theory and the three circle model it could be concluded that there is 
a broad variety of family companies, which all have different requirements 
concerning corporate governance. Furthermore, the objectives, elements and 
instruments of business governance and family governance were examined to 
show, what benefits and characteristics they have for medium-sized family 
companies. In addition, the governance code for family businesses was 
highlighted as the main tool for family companies.  
The empirical part of the thesis was based on the interviews, which were 
conducted with seventeen medium-sized family businesses. The results were 
both compared to each other and to the theoretical findings. The main focus of 
the empirical research was the analysis of the current situation of the sample 
companies to evaluate the significance of corporate governance for them. The 
theoretical framework was used to understand the differences between the 
individual companies. 
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The assumption that medium-sized family businesses in Germany have not 
(yet) developed their governance in a professional way was supported by the 
empirical findings. Furthermore, these companies know about the significance 
of good governance and already have certain regulations and instruments to 
improve their governance. However, it has to be concluded that there are 
discrepancies between the smallest and larger participants of the study. One of 
the main findings was that the larger the company regarding employee numbers 
and turnover are the more likely they have implemented corporate governance 
mechanisms. Moreover, it has to be said that the ownership and management 
structure of the companies also have a vast impact on the state of family 
business governance in these companies. The more complex these structures 
and the organisation are the more instruments and elements of family business 
governance are realised. Besides, the author recognised a gap between the 
perceptions in theory and practice about the necessity of family business 
governance. Medium-sized family businesses do not necessarily see the 
benefits of corporate governance for their business, but rather associate it with 
larger family groups. 
Ultimately, the study has shown that family business governance has 
significance for medium-sized family businesses in Germany. Nevertheless, the 
author would rather evaluate family business governance as a voluntary 
obligation than a necessity. In particular for the family companies with equal 
shares of ownership and management family business governance cannot be 
seen as a necessity, but the other family businesses can support their success 
with family business governance. 
Eventually, this thesis is mainly about the significance of family business 
governance in medium-sized family businesses. However, there are many 
possibilities for further research about corporate governance for family 
companies. First of all, it could be analysed how medium-sized family 
companies can implement and establish corporate governance mechanisms in 
their organisation. On this basis, a study could develop exact guidelines in 
particular for medium-sized family businesses about corporate governance. For 
medium-sized family companies it might be quite helpful to facilitate a code, 
such as the GKFU, as many of the recommendations are quite ambitious for 
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medium-sized family companies. A majority of the recommendations and 
demands are formulated as absolute necessities, even if they are only 
applicable with huge efforts for medium-sized family businesses. This might 
limit the benefit for these companies and they rather abstain from corporate 
governance. Furthermore, in a further study the object of investigation could be 
narrowed down to family companies with employee figures between fifty and 
499 persons or by excluding medium-sized family companies with simple 
ownership and management structures. This would increase validity of the 
findings and help to get a better idea of corporate governance in medium-sized 
family businesses, as it became apparent that larger family companies with 
more complex structures tend to have a major need for family business 
governance than companies in the hands of an individual owner-manager. 
Besides changing the object of investigation, a further study could increase the 
number of participants to enhance the representativeness of the findings. 
Finally, it might be interesting to investigate certain industry sectors, as they 
might be influenced by specific characteristics and factors that affect corporate 
governance. In this context, transparency is a particularly interesting aspect, 
because the interviews determine that for example the mechanical engineering 
industry is more obliged to transparency due to their difficult economic situation. 
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Appendix 1  Interview (Original version in German) 
Interview Corporate Governance in mittelständischen Familienunternehmen 
Firma:  
Name Teilnehmer:  
Branche: 
Anzahl Mitarbeiter: 
Gründungsjahr: 
Rechtsform: 
Umsatz: 
 
Family Business Governance bezeichnet die Unternehmensführung in 
Familienunternehmen. Sie besteht aus den Bereichen Business Governance 
und Family Governance.  
Im Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen sind Leitlinien definiert, die bei 
der Organisation von Führung und Kontrolle im Unternehmen unterstützen und 
den Zusammenhalt der Familie sichern. Zentrale Aspekte des Governance 
Kodex umfassen die Themen Inhaber, Aufsichtsgremium, 
Unternehmensführung, Ergebnisermittlung und Ergebnisverwendung, die 
Übertragbarkeit der Inhaberschaft und das Ausscheiden aus dem 
Gesellschafterkreis.  
 
Business Governance 
 
Business Governance ist eine Komponente der Family Business Governance 
und behandelt die Einführung transparenter und nachvollziehbarer Strukturen 
und Instrumente zur Führung und Aufsicht eines Unternehmens.  
 
1. Haben Sie Ziele und Werte für Ihr Unternehmen festgelegt und wenn ja, 
welche? 
 
2. Sind Ihnen die folgenden Ziele wichtig? 
- Zusammenhalt der Familie 
- Gegenseitige Unterstützung 
- Familienunternehmen bleiben 
- Unabhängigkeit als Familienunternehmen 
- Positives Image/Reputation 
 
3. Sind Ihnen die folgenden Werte wichtig? 
- Respekt 
- Toleranz 
- Solidarität 
- Verantwortung 
- Bescheidenheit 
- Maßhalten 
- Integrität 
- Kontinuität 
- Glaubwürdigkeit 
 4. Sind Sie vertraut mit dem Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen 
und welchen Nutzen sehen Sie in einem Kodex? 
 
5. Haben Sie Richtlinien des Kodex schriftlich fixiert und wenden Sie diese in 
ihrem Unternehmen an? Wenn nein, warum nicht? Wenn ja, gibt es eine 
Familienverfassung oder ähnliche Leitlinien? 
 
6. Welche Aspekte guter Unternehmensführung sind für Sie besonders 
wichtig? 
 
7. Haben Sie ein Aufsichtsgremium? Wenn ja, welche Aufgaben obliegen 
diesem? Größe und Zusammensetzung? 
 
8. Wenn nein, würden Sie zukünftig freiwillig ein Aufsichtsgremium 
einrichten? Begründung? 
 
9. Für wie wichtig erachten Sie Transparenz gegenüber Banken und anderen 
externen Stakeholdern? 
 
10. Die zentralen Instrumente der Business Governance sind interne Revision, 
Risikomanagement und Compliance Management. Setzen Sie diese ein 
und wie sind sie ausgestaltet? Welche Bedeutung haben Sie? 
 
11. Internes Kontrollsystem: Nutzen Sie die folgenden Instrumente in Ihrem 
Unternehmen?  
- Genehmigungen  
- Berechtigungen  
- Abstimmungen  
- Investitions- und Einkaufsrichtlinien  
- Vergütungsregelungen  
- Vier-Augen-Prinzip 
- Kreditlimits 
- Rechnungsprüfung 
- Verhaltenskodex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Family Governance 
 
Die Family Governance beschäftigt sich thematisch mit der Inhaberfamilie eines 
Unternehmens und den entsprechenden Gremien. 
 
1. In welchem Umfang ist die Familie an der Leitung des Unternehmens 
beteiligt? 
 
2. Welche Gründe sehen Sie (gegebenenfalls) für die Einbeziehung eines 
familienfremden Managements? Wie ist die grundsätzliche Einstellung im 
Unternehmen gegenüber einem familienfremden Management? 
 
3. Aus wie vielen Mitgliedern besteht die Geschäftsführung? 
 
4. Welcher Verwandtschaftsgrad herrscht zwischen den Mitgliedern der 
Geschäftsführung? 
 
5. Existiert eine Familienrepräsentanz? (Familienrat, 
Gesellschafterausschuss) 
 
6. Wie viele Gesellschafter gibt es insgesamt und wie sind die Anteile auf 
diese verteilt? 
 
7. Wer darf in Ihrem Unternehmen Gesellschafter werden? (leibliche Kinder, 
Ehepartner,…) 
 
8. Was passiert mit den Anteilen eines Gesellschafters, wenn dieser aus dem 
Unternehmen ausscheiden möchte oder verstirbt? 
 
9. Haben Sie Regelungen bezüglich der Unternehmensnachfolge getroffen? 
Wenn ja, welche? 
 
10. Haben Familien- oder Unternehmensinteressen für die Familie Vorrang? 
 
11. Wie wichtig ist Ihnen der Zusammenhalt in der Familie?  
 
12. Haben Sie innerhalb der Familie gemeinsame Aktivitäten und Maßnahmen, 
die den Zusammenhalt und die Bindung zum Unternehmen stärken sollen? 
 
13. Wie lösen Sie eventuelle Konflikte zwischen den Gesellschaftern?  
 
14. Ist ihr Unternehmen gesellschaftlich engagiert? Wenn ja, in welcher 
Weise? 
 
  
 Appendix 2  Interview (English translation) 
Interview Corporate Governance in medium-sized family businesses 
Company:  
Participant:  
Industry Sector: 
Employees: 
Year of Foundation: 
Legal form: 
Turnover: 
 
Family Business Governance describes the good governance in family 
companies. It consists of the two fields business governance and family 
governance.  
In the governance code for family companies guidelines are defined, which 
support the organization of management and control in the company and 
assure the solidarity within the family. Central aspects of the governance code 
are the issues ownership, supervisory boards, management, appropriation of 
profits, the fungibility of ownership and the resignation of owners. 
 
Business Governance 
 
Business Governance is one of the components of family business governance 
and deals with the implementation of transparent structures and instruments to 
manage and control the company.  
 
1. Which values and objectives do you have determined for your company? 
 
2. Are the following objectives of importance for you? 
- Solidarity of the family 
- Mutual support 
- To remain a family business 
- Independence 
- Positive image/reputation 
 
3. Are the following values of importance for you? 
- Respect 
- Tolerance 
- Solidarity 
- Responsibility 
- Modesty 
- Moderation 
- Integrity 
- Continuity 
- Credibility  
 
 
 4. Are you familiar with the Governance Code for family businesses (GKFU) 
and which benefit would you expect? 
 
5. Have you implemented guidelines of the GKFU? If not, why? Or are 
there any similar guidelines or a family constitution? 
 
6. Which aspects of good governance are particularly important for you? 
 
7. Do you have a supervisory board? If yes, which tasks does it have and 
how is it composed? 
 
8. If not, would you establish a voluntary board in future?  
 
9. Do you think transparency towards financial institutions or other external 
stakeholders is important? 
 
10. The central instruments of business governance are internal audit, risk 
management and compliance management. Do you use them? How are 
they developed? 
 
11. Internal control system: Do you use the following instruments in your 
company?  
- Approvals 
- Authorisations 
- Coordination 
- Guidelines for investments or purchasing 
- Compensation guidelines 
- Four-eyes principles 
- Credit limits 
- Auditing of accounts 
- Code of conduct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Family Governance 
 
The family governance concentrates on the owner family and correspondent 
bodies and instruments.  
 
1. To which extent the family participates in the management of the 
company? 
 
2. Which purpose would lead you to an external management? How is the 
tenor towards an external management in the company?  
 
3. How many persons are in the management? 
 
4. Which degree of relationship do the members of the management have?  
 
5. Do you have a family representation? (family council, shareholder’s 
meeting) 
 
6. How many partners exist and how are the shares distributed?  
 
7. Who is allowed to become a partner and owner of the company? (children, 
spouses, …) 
 
8. What happens with the shares of a partner, if he or she wants to resign or 
dies?  
 
9. Do you already have regulations for the succession? If yes, which?  
 
10. Are the family interests or the company interests more important for you?  
 
11. How important is the solidarity in the family?  
 
12. Do you have common activities or measures in the family to strengthen the 
solidarity and ties to the company?  
 
13. How do you solve potential conflicts among the partners?  
 
14. Is the company socially committed? If yes, how?  
 
 
